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ABSTRACT
If an agency newly declares that it lacks statutory power previously
claimed, how should such a move—what this Article calls agency
statutory abnegation—be reviewed? Given the array of strategies an
agency might use to make a policy change or move the law in a
deregulatory direction, why might statutory abnegation be chosen?
After all, it is always a perilous and likely doctrinally disadvantageous
strategy for agencies. Nonetheless, agencies from time to time have
utilized statutory abnegation as justification for deregulatory shifts.
Actions by agencies during 2017 and 2018, under the administration of
President Donald J. Trump, reveal an especially prevalent use of such
statutory abnegation. This Article explains the agency statutoryabnegation strategy, illustrating its variants with review of past and
recent uses. It then distinguishes statutory abnegation from agency
actions and explanations that might appear to manifest or permit such
a strategy but actually involve doctrinally different and less problematic
settings. Then, after distilling the key elements of doctrines governing
agency policy change, or what is sometimes referred to as consistency
doctrine, it reviews procedural and analytical hurdles agencies must
surmount to succeed in a policy change. It explores how analysis of this
strategic move reveals the inadequacy of—or perhaps the naïve,
publicly interested optimism behind—prevalent theories and linked
normative claims about agency incentives, judicial roles, and political
accountability. The Article closes by analyzing the persistent judicial
Copyright © 2019 William W. Buzbee.
† Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, wwb11@law.georgetown.edu.
The author thanks Mitchell Bernard, Rebecca Bratspies, John Graham, Margaret Lemos,
Nicholas Parillo, Todd Rakoff, Andrew Schoenholtz, Peter Strauss, David Vladeck, Susannah
Weaver, as well as Thanh Nguyen and his Georgetown Law Library colleagues, and research
assistant Samuel Gray. He also thanks Duke Law School and the Duke Law Journal for hosting
the symposium on “Deregulatory Games” for which this Article was written, as well as Sam
Howe, Andrea Beathard, Hugh Hamilton, John Hamilton, Abbey McNaughton, South Moore,
and Ashley Shan for their work on this Article and other symposium arrangements and Articles.

BUZBEE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1510

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/25/2019 4:08 PM

[Vol. 68:1509

rejection of such strategies and the underlying normative vision they
reflect about the balance of law and politics in the administrative state.
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INTRODUCTION
Late in the administration of President Barack Obama, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) promulgated final
regulations constraining greenhouse-gas pollution from power plants,
regulating refurbished trucks, and dealing with pollution from oil and
gas extraction, among many other areas.1 Likewise, the Department of
Agriculture newly regulated livestock-handling practices. Immigration
authorities took actions shielding immigrants from legal jeopardy or
imminent deportation. Early in the administration of President Donald
J. Trump, however, these agencies and numerous others not only
sought to reverse course and roll back these actions but did so with a
previously rare rationale. Contrary to these agencies’ earlier claims of
power and extensive legal and factual justifications, these same
regulators now claimed, in a deregulatory mode, that the underlying
statutes precluded those previous actions. The exact wording of such
disclaimers of power varied slightly—for example, the form of
regulation “exceeded [our] proper role and authority,”2 or was
“contrary to the plain language of the [statute],”3 or was rooted in
“implausible” claims of statutory power,4 or was illegal because the
agency’s prior justification “rewr[ote] unambiguous statutory terms.”5
But again and again, these agencies did not merely seek to adjust
policy; they newly declared a diminished view of their own statutorily
conferred powers.
When an agency newly declares that it lacks statutory power
previously claimed, how should such a move—what this Article calls
agency statutory abnegation—be reviewed? Does such a rationale for a
surrender of agency power, as well as the usual accompanying reversal
of policy views, change what courts should demand of agencies
pursuing a policy change? Should the generally deregulatory valence
of such statutory abnegation trigger different agency justification
burdens and judicial expectations? Given the array of strategies an
agency might use to make a policy change or move the law in a

1. These actions are discussed infra Part I.
2. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,042 (Oct. 16, 2017) (Proposed Rule)
[hereinafter CPP Repeal Proposal] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); see also infra notes 69, 123
and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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deregulatory direction, why might statutory abnegation be chosen?
After all, as explored below, it is always a perilous and likely
doctrinally disadvantageous strategy for agencies. Furthermore, if it is
relied upon to the neglect of other justificatory rationales that
administrative-law doctrine requires, then policy change sought
through statutory abnegation faces likely rejection in the courts.
Several well-established propositions about agency power both
illuminate and raise questions about the statutory-abnegation
deregulatory strategy. Agencies will ordinarily receive deference in
their interpretations of laws they administer, and statutory abnegation
involves, at its core, agency statutory interpretation.6 And, similarly,
when agencies assess societal conditions and their own resources and
decide how zealously to pursue their statutory tasks, they will also
receive deference and sometimes almost no judicial scrutiny.7 In
addition, agencies are seldom ordered to regulate in a particular way;
most statutes leave agencies latitude to make pragmatic judgments
about regulatory choices, even when they are rooted in some required,
statutorily provided criteria.8 Moreover, modern cases seem to grant a
“plus” factor to regulatory approaches that harness market
mechanisms, are sensitive to costs and benefits, or provide regulatory
targets or states handling regulatory implementation with flexibility.9
And, by definition, the agency statutory-abnegation claims analyzed
here involve agency policy changes; long-established law states that an
agency’s initial regulatory views are not frozen in stone. Policy change
is not legally suspect.10

6. See infra notes 136–37, Part II.A.2, and Part II.B, and accompanying text (discussing
deference doctrines and abnegation); see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference,
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293 (2016) (discussing numerous deference regimes and latitude for
policy changes with new administrations).
7. See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text (discussing judicial deference to initial
agency inaction and its relation to abnegation).
8. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U.
L. REV. 471, 483 (2011) (observing that agencies creating and revising policies usually have
latitude for a “range of choices”).
9. See William W. Buzbee, Federalism-Facilitated Regulatory Innovation and Regression in
a Time of Environmental Legislative Gridlock, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 451, 474–75 (2016)
(discussing cases providing such sympathetic review).
10. William W. Buzbee, The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency in
Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1366–68, 1392–1401 (2018) [hereinafter Buzbee, The
Tethered President] (discussing the expectation of agency policy adjustments and the law
governing such changes, with a focus on the centrality of comparative attention to facts and
reasoning in pursuing a change).
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These propositions about agency power and judicial review might,
upon a superficial initial analysis, seem to lead next to the logical
proposition that agencies should be granted broad latitude to engage
in statutory abnegation. However, the line of cases that collectively
create the body of consistency doctrine squarely rejects any argument
for less rigorous judicial review.11 This is not to claim that abnegation
is itself illegal; it is possible that an agency could correctly self-identify
a past illegal claim of power. As analyzed below, however, the
statutory-abnegation rationale for a policy rollback or change is
unusual and generally disadvantageous. Further, in the context of
recent regulatory rollbacks, abnegation claims have been accompanied
by little agency effort to comply with longstanding precepts of
administrative law and judicial expectations guiding agency actions—
especially doctrine guiding agency policy change. Moreover,
abnegation strategies have tended to involve settings where, if the
agency’s claimed lack of power is correct and the agency does not
proffer rationales rooted in its expertise, the agency receives zero
deference. Agencies can pursue policy change and may, at times, even
have room to rely on statutory abnegation as part of such policy shifts.
But consistency doctrine and a web of related law reject—or at least
seem to reject—the legal adequacy of an agency policy change rooted
in statutory abnegation that relies only on a new and power-shrinking
legal interpretation to justify the shift. The “no power whatsoever”
variant of statutory abnegation might possibly tempt reviewing courts
to demand less of agencies, but this variant, which is discussed below,
would be rare. Upon closer analysis, it also fails to persuasively justify
abandonment of, or a carveout from, prevailing analytical and
procedural obligations required for agency policy change.12
Nonetheless, agencies from time to time have utilized statutoryabnegation claims as part of their justification for deregulatory shifts.
The George W. Bush administration sought to justify its policy change
and inaction on climate change with an abnegation claim.13 Agency
actions under the Trump administration have revealed an especially
prevalent use of such statutory-abnegation strategies.14 They are often
explained, at least in part, as undertaken to comply with overtly
11. See id. (illustrating the standards developed for statutory abnegation); see also infra Part
II.A.4 (applying these cases to abnegation strategies); see also infra Part III.D (reviewing cases
rejecting the adequacy of agency actions relying on abnegation-based deregulation).
12. See infra Part III.E (discussing this issue).
13. See infra notes 32–41, 204 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part I.A.
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deregulatory executive orders or to conform to the policy preferences
of the president. Courts reviewing past and recent statutoryabnegation claims, however, have generally rejected such policy shifts,
finding the actions legally inadequate and inconsistent with doctrinal
hurdles.15 They have refused to review statutory abnegation with any
lessened burden of agency justification.
This Article explains the agency statutory-abnegation strategy,
illustrating its variants with review of past and recent uses. It then
distinguishes statutory-abnegation claims from agency actions and
explanations that might appear to manifest or permit such a strategy,
but that actually involve doctrinally different and less problematic
settings. Then, after distilling the key elements of consistency doctrine
that governs judicial review of agency policy change, it reviews
procedural and analytical hurdles agencies must surmount to succeed
in a policy change. These cases, plus other foundational administrativelaw cases like Chevron,16 undoubtedly give agencies room to pursue
policy changes. But these cases repeatedly affirm and explain doctrinal
steps that agencies must follow when and if they seek to change policy,
and agencies have neglected or only glancingly addressed many of
these hurdles in advancing their statutory-abnegation claims.17 This
disjuncture between doctrinal hurdles and minimal agency
justifications for policy changes explains why such agency actions,
including statutory-abnegation claims, have often met with failure.
But this doctrinal disadvantage makes the statutory-abnegation
strategy all the more puzzling. If—as is true—bare statutoryabnegation claims often weaken agency power over targets of
regulation, reduce agency discretion, are doctrinally disadvantageous,
and appear destined in most instances for eventual judicial rejection,
why might agencies nonetheless persist in utilizing such a strategy? The
recent prevalence of this strategic move reveals the inadequacy of—or
perhaps the naïve, publicly interested optimism behind—prevalent
theories and linked normative claims about agency incentives, judicial
roles, and political accountability.

15. See infra Part II.
16. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
17. As explained below, abnegation claims can involve complete disavowal of power to
occupy a regulatory area at all, or a narrower claim that a past assertion of authority or a particular
regulatory action was legally precluded. Abnegation is not asserted if an agency is merely claiming
it has found a better way to regulate or it thinks the past action is vulnerable to being held
arbitrary and capricious. See infra Part I.
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This Article’s analysis reveals often neglected risks posed by
politically influenced regulatory actions, especially if linked to the
president. Statutory-abnegation strategies often reflect obeisance to
the president or executive-branch political appointees’ preferences,
but at the price of undercutting or ignoring equally if not more
important sources of regulatory legitimacy and political accountability.
Agencies utilizing this strategy have offered slender legal reasoning,
paid little attention to statutory criteria, avoided past rationales, and
shown little or no engagement with on-the-ground impacts of the old
and new policy choices. Current doctrine gives agencies no space to
dodge comparative analysis of such “contingencies”—namely, the
science, data, empirical assessments, and old and new legal reasoning
relevant to evaluating the policy shift.18 Politicized justifications and
actions that are likely motivated by electoral advantage or hierarchical
obedience to political leadership, but which disregard statutory
requirements and these doctrinally created hurdles, come at a
considerable cost in the form of lost political accountability.
This statutory-abnegation strategy does, however, fit within
political-economic theories that call for analysis of regulatory
structures and actions with attention to all players’ regulatory
incentives. In particular, abnegation-based strategies may be a
knowing attempt to downplay expert or technocratic roles shaped by
statutory process and criteria, on the one hand, and politically sensitive
or motivated policymaking and interest-group entreaties on the other.
Situating this move and its apparent rationales within this politicaleconomic literature, especially positive political theory, illuminates the
appeal for statutory-abnegation proponents, at least in some politicaleconomic environments, of this losing legal strategy.19 By viewing
abnegating agencies and presidents as acting in a political and legally
constrained environment that is dynamic and involves regulatory
actors’ interactions, this puzzling strategy becomes easier to
understand.20 Agency actions lacking legal merit may reflect not legal
error, but rather the knowing pursuit of electoral benefits. Agencies,

18. I explore the role of such contingencies in the body of consistency doctrine and how they
constrain and shape efforts to change policy in Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10.
19. For two articles distilling and setting forth early core attributes of positive political theory
(“PPT”), see generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip A. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory
in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 462–63 (1991) and Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political
Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 43–51 (1994).
20. Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 6 (identifying these variables as the core enrichment of the
rational-actor theory provided by PPT).
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and presidents under whom they serve, can generate substantial
electoral and perhaps political-party benefits through statutoryabnegation claims and repeatedly touted deregulatory and policyreversal efforts, even if illegal, largely symbolic, and providing only
transitory relief. Courts, however, with their focus on the law and the
need for justified, “reasoned decisionmaking” by agencies, have
emphasized the procedural and legal inadequacies of agency statutoryabnegation claims. Some degree of policy change will usually be
possible, but courts are likely to—and should—continue to force
agencies to hew to statutory criteria and procedures, full engagement
with the new and old actions’ legal and factual underpinnings and
reasoning, and burdens of justification.21 This body of consistency
doctrine integrates and reflects respect for the multiple forms of
political accountability that remain central to the legality and
legitimacy of the administrative state. Giving politically or
presidentially induced regulatory reversals some major “plus” when
reviewed in court would reward actions that may intentionally
disregard the substantive and procedural choices of Congress, as
reflected in statutes. It would also run afoul of enduring judicial
doctrines governing agencies seeking to make a deregulatory policy
change.
Part I defines statutory abnegation, reviews agency uses of this
strategy, and distinguishes it from several other ways agencies may
seek to change policy or achieve deregulatory ends. Part II assesses
agency statutory abnegation from a doctrinal perspective, showing how
its recent uses have generally flunked doctrinal requirements for
agencies hoping to achieve a policy change. Part III explores why
agency abnegation might nonetheless be pursued and may even be a
rational choice when viewed through the lens of political benefits.
However, abnegation will often be destined for legal defeat because
the agency either incorrectly interpreted the relevant statute or failed
to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and
consistency doctrine. But long before then, presidents, responsive
agencies, and regulatory targets favoring deregulation may see

21. As observed by Professor Seidenfeld, agencies will always be influenced by politics, but
review of their actions does, and must, focus on legality in light of underlying science, facts, data,
and reasoning. Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 144–45 (2012); see also Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics
in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 6–8 (2009) (expressing sympathy for a “place
for politics” in regulatory policymaking, but stating that evidence and statutory criteria limit room
for presidential influence).
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multiple benefits of such unlawfully pursued policy changes. This Part
closes by exploring the multiple forms of political accountability that
normally constrain agencies and that, when ignored by agencies, have
led reviewing courts to reject actions rooted in abnegation claims.
I. AGENCY STATUTORY ABNEGATION, DEFINED AND
DISTINGUISHED
Administrative agencies engage in a multitude of actions in several
different modes, most of which involve some degree of policymaking.
Modern agency policymaking occurs through notice-and-comment
rulemaking; issuance of guidance and other policy documents without
the notice-and-comment process; and enforcement actions, linked
adjudications, and resulting orders.22 In all of these settings, agencies
both apply procedural and substantive policy choices set by Congress
in enabling legislation, and implement and often adjust agency-set
policies.23 Some agency actions truly just involve applying policy
previously set by Congress or the agency, but some degree of policy
creation, choice, and change is a common and unexceptional
occurrence.24 In any of these procedural modes, an agency can reveal a
22. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383,
1386–90 (2004) (reviewing the law granting agencies latitude to choose procedurally how to make
policy).
23. For analyses of agency latitude for policy change and consistency doctrine, see Buzbee,
The Tethered President, supra note 10 (analyzing the need for agencies to address contingencies
underlying old and new actions and discussing arrays of influences shaping consistency doctrine);
Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1029–30 (2005) (examining
procedural modes generating old and new policies); Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski,
Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112, 115 (2011) (analyzing latitude for agency policy
change and distinguishing between “expository” policy declarations rooted in language and
“prescriptive” reasoning based on policy choices, and arguing for different levels of judicial
scrutiny in light of the change mode); see also Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 783–88 (2017) (analyzing agencies’ errors about their
authority, possible motivations, and judicial responses under the Prill doctrine, Prill v. NLRB, 755
F.2d 941, 956–57 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Hemel and Nielson are not focused on agencies denying
themselves powers or agency reversals about their views, as is this Article, but they offer insights
into agency motivations and values served by current doctrine rejecting actions founded on errors
regarding agency power. They disagree with scholars questioning the value of such remands to
agencies requiring them to act based on a correct understanding of their power. See id. at 760–62
(responding to a discussion of Prill claims from Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in
Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 253, 296–301 (2017)).
24. See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1359–70 (2012) [hereinafter Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common
Law] (comparing agencies’ and courts’ institutional competence and administrative law’s
development in a common law–like manner); see also O’Connell, supra note 8, at 479–86
(analyzing political transitions and resulting agency regulatory changes).
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policy change based on statutory abnegation. This Part introduces
agency statutory abnegation and distinguishes it from other sorts of
agency actions.
Agency statutory-abnegation strategies have occasionally been
asserted in the past, most famously by EPA during the George W. Bush
administration leading to the Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts
v. EPA.25 But agency statutory-abnegation claims became increasingly
prevalent during 2017 and 2018 in an array of rapidly rolled out
deregulatory actions and policy shifts by numerous agencies.26 Many of
these shifts are explained as part of agency responses to Executive
Order 13,771, issued by President Trump, that calls for agencies to
eliminate two regulations for each new regulation, plus ensure that
regulatory actions result in no new net costs.27 Some such actions
followed more specific presidential orders or memoranda, while others
emerged from agencies with no advance public involvement of the
White House.28
In its strongest form, agency statutory abnegation has the
following attributes. Acting against a backdrop of unchanged statutory
law, an agency reexamines its powers under that law. In a break from
past agency power claims and, usually, related actions, the agency
newly declares that it no longer has authority it previously asserted.29
This is an act of agency “abnegation”—self-denial of authority—
because, without any statutory or judicially mandated change, the
agency is denying itself statutory power previously claimed.
Agencies have utilized these statutory-abnegation strategies in
several different forms. In abnegation’s most unadorned, bare form, an
agency reverses an action or policy and explains the reversal as
compelled by its new view that it lacks (and earlier lacked) the
authority previously claimed. Other forms of abnegation can be less
boldly asserted; many make a limited claim of a particular past
overreach or of a constrained set of regulatory options. Others are
accompanied by a fallback claim of a mere preference for a different
statutory interpretation.
25. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
26. See infra Part I.A (reviewing such uses).
27. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
28. See infra Part I.A (reviewing an array of abnegation actions and discussing responses to
regulation-specific presidential memoranda or orders).
29. As reviewed in Parts I.A and I.B, abnegation claims can be utilized in all modes through
which agencies make policy, namely through rulemakings, through litigation and other
adjudicatory actions, and in guidance or policy documents.
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But abnegation is quite different from the more standard agency
proffer of a different policy that is described as also an option under
existing law.30 In that more typical setting, the agency asserts that
statutory language provides room for context-specific agency exercise
of discretion and, in light of new assessment of facts, science, and
regulatory options, gives the agency room to choose from several
reasonable policy choices.31 Often both the old policy and the new
policy are presented as permissible options, at least as a matter of
language. With statutory abnegation, in contrast, an agency is denying
it had statutory power to act as it did in the past and is disavowing
future assertion of such power. This Part now analyzes a cross section
of examples of agency policy changes rooted in statutory abnegation
and then distinguishes variants of abnegation and other agency policychange strategies.
A. Statutory-Abnegation Examples
Perhaps the most famous example of agency abnegation occurred
in the agency actions leading to the Supreme Court’s Massachusetts v.
EPA decision rejecting EPA’s declination to regulate greenhouse-gas
emissions (“GHGs”).32 EPA had not regulated GHGs, but two general
counsel had previously written memoranda and provided responses to
congressional inquiries that declared EPA had such authority.33 When
the administration of President George W. Bush denied a petition to
regulate GHGs from motor vehicles, it offered an array of justifications
for its statutory-abnegation conclusion.34 Some rationales related to
presidential authority and discretion regarding policy priorities, but its
primary claim was that it could not regulate GHGs as an “air pollutant”
despite the Clean Air Act’s broad statutory language.35 Breaking from

30. The general assumption is that agencies will prefer statutory interpretations that
preserve their discretionary powers. Hemel & Nielson, supra note 23, at 762 (reviewing
scholarship making this assumption); see also Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016
Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5–6,
24–28, 31–38, 71–72 (2017) [hereinafter Metzger, 1930s Redux] (reviewing and challenging claims
about inappropriate uses of discretion or excess agency power).
31. This was the setting of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 853–66 (1984) (reviewing the history of EPA’s approaches and reasons for its
judicially upheld policy change). Neither the agency nor the Supreme Court viewed the agency’s
new policy as mandatory or its old views as illegal. Id. at 842.
32. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510–16 (2007) (reviewing this history).
33. Id. at 510–11.
34. Id. at 511–15 (reviewing the Bush administration’s denial rationales).
35. Id.
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its earlier general counsel’s memoranda, EPA—under its new
statutory-abnegation view—said the statute had a different, more local
focus and that Congress could not have intended regulation of a gas
generally not perceived as a pollutant and that caused effects on a
global scale.36 Much of its analysis and legal argument relied on FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,37 asserting that EPA could not
claim such economically significant authority without a clearer
delegation from Congress.38 EPA did not analyze the effects of its
declination to act, but because the past EPA claims of power had not
been accompanied by regulatory actions subject to some new rollback,
the agency did not have effects of past and new actions to compare.39
As further analyzed below, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v.
EPA rejected the agency’s new statutory-abnegation claim and the
agency’s reliance on presidential and administrative prerogatives to
make politically related choices about resource priorities. The Court
stated that the agency had to decide whether to act based on statutory
criteria, as construed by the Court.40 And the Court called for agency
analysis of underlying science and climate-change effects in light of
those statutory criteria.41
Statutory abnegation became common in a wave of 2017 and 2018
deregulatory actions by agencies under the Trump administration.
Many of these abnegation claims were accompanied by little or no
engagement with facts, science, studies, or findings previously viewed
as relevant to regulatory decisions. Further, they often provided only
summary engagement with the agencies’ own earlier, contrary legal
views and included little analysis of on-the-ground effects likely to
result from the claimed lack of power. The abnegation claims are, for
purposes of this Article, separate from the absence of accompanying
analysis and justifications; it appears, however, that avoidance of this
considerable burden may partly explain agencies’ reliance on
36. Id.
37. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
38. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922,
52,924–25 (Sept. 8, 2003) (Notice of denial of petition for rulemaking); see also Massachusetts, 549
U.S. at 511–13 (discussing EPA’s position).
39. As discussed below, under the State Farm case, an agency that changes its policy needs
to fully address rationales, compare past and current facts, and justify its change. See Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48–49 (1983). In
Massachusetts, there were contrary interpretations of the Clean Air Act but no past regulation of
GHGs or effects to assess.
40. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528–33.
41. Id. at 528–36.
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abnegation claims.42 Although recent agency statutory-abnegation
actions are many, a substantial but partial sample is described here,
including analysis of some of the most visible, politically salient
actions.43 A few others resulting in court decisions are discussed at the
close of the Article, including the many judicial rejections of Trumpadministration policy shifts utilizing variants of abnegation claims.
For example, in the immigration arena, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) in 2018 ended the Temporary Protected
Status (“TPS”) of immigrants from El Salvador and Haiti living in the
United States.44 In doing so, however, DHS not only changed its
longstanding interpretation of the underlying statute to justify the
revocations, it also—in another breach of agency policy-change
obligations—failed to acknowledge that shift or to address additional
risks to immigrant safety that it had earlier viewed as legally relevant
to TPS status.45 It is hence unclear if DHS was aware of the policy
42. As discussed infra Part III.B, agencies interested in quick and potentially enduring
deregulatory change may see several political benefits if their use of abnegation proves successful.
But an agency could claim it lacks statutory power and still provide analysis comporting with the
requirements of consistency doctrine. See infra Part II (exploring the doctrinal answer to
abnegation strategies both if used alone and if used with the agency analysis required by
consistency doctrine). Part III explores why courts have rejected abnegation claims and soundly
still require agencies making abnegation claims to provide the comparative analysis required by
consistency doctrine. The key elements of consistency doctrine as set forth in Supreme Court
cases are discussed infra in Part II.A.4.
43. See, e.g., Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration is
Constantly Losing in Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/the-real-reason-president-trump-is-constantly-losing-in-court/2019/03/
19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html?utm_term=.c9d7ba8b8e5f
[https://
perma.cc/9ZD8-9D78] (describing court reticence to permit “virtually unexplained” deregulatory
policy changes across government agencies).
44. Compare DHS Extension of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected
Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 44,645, 44,645–47 (July 8, 2016) (Notice) (extending TPS due to safety risks
from an initial TPS-triggering earthquake event but noting other statutorily specified sources of
safety risks to explain extending this status), with Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen M. Nielson Announcement on Temporary Protected
Status for El Salvador (Jan. 8, 2018) (announcing termination of TPS designation because the
“original conditions . . . no longer exist” and stating, therefore, that “under the applicable statute,
the current TPS designation must be terminated”); compare DHS Termination of the Designation
of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed. Reg. 2648, 2650 (Jan. 18, 2018) (Notice)
(terminating TPS because “the conditions for Haiti’s designation . . . relating to the 2010
earthquake . . . are no longer met” and limiting analysis to the effects of that one event), with
DHS Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg. 23,830,
23,831–32 (May 24, 2017) (Notice) (extending TPS and discussing lingering earthquake effects as
well as other risks to safety, including other storm events, agricultural harvest problems, a weak
public health system, a cholera epidemic, lack of safe water, extreme poverty, corruption, and
government instability).
45. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Agencies making a policy change are required
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change it was making. In 2018, it stated that it “must” return TPS
immigrants when the original triggering condition ends; under previous
administrations, and even in two early Trump-administration actions,
the agency considered all of the criteria that can justify TPS eligibility
in deciding whether to continue TPS, not just the initial triggering
event.46 In asserting that it “must” return émigrés due to the
termination of safety risks caused by the initial triggering event, and in
accompanying statements that the “law does not allow” consideration
of other conditions, DHS did not discuss what would happen to these
former TPS designees upon return to their countries.47 Statutorily
specified categories of risk that had earlier justified TPS extensions
were, in 2018, apparently no longer viewed as relevant.48
In a more visible action that also linked to President Trump’s
campaign promises to take a harder line on immigration, in 2017 the
administration, through a legal opinion of the Attorney General and
action by DHS, declared it would abandon the Obama administration’s
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program.49
DACA was not a finalized notice-and-comment regulation but instead
a factually and legally explained policy of regulatory forbearance that
DHS claimed was permissible under relevant statutory and

to declare such a change and justify it; they cannot silently make a policy change or consistently
vacillate in a way reflecting the absence of any policy. See Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra
note 10, at 1401–03 (discussing these agency policy-change obligations and metarules).
46. DHS Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg.
at 23, 831–32 (considering chronic public-health and governmental issues beyond the scope of the
natural-disaster damage). For further review of this regulatory history in a challenge to the
revocation of TPS for Haitians, see Complaint, NAACP v. U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-100239-MJG, 2018 (D. Md. Jan. 24, 2018).
47. See Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1090–91 (N.D. Cal. 2018) [Ramos II] (opining
that DHS had not acknowledged its “substantive and highly consequential” policy shift in
“eliminating consideration of intervening conditions not directly related to the originating
condition”).
48. This change in agency practice and the policy change it reflected resulted in two court
decisions indicating, in preliminary rulings on a motion to dismiss and then for a preliminary
injunction, that these unacknowledged policy shifts were likely illegal under the APA due to how
they did not disclose and explain the policy shift. See Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1108
(N.D. Cal. 2018) [Ramos I] (“[A]gencies ‘may not . . . depart from a prior policy sub silentio or
simply disregard rules that are still on the books,’ and ‘must show that there are good reasons for
the new policy.’” (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009))); Ramos
II at 1089–90 (quoting Ramos I’s discussion of APA constraints on agencies’ ability to change
policy).
49. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011,
1025–26 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (reviewing the history of the enactment and subsequent abandonment
of the DACA program).
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administrative law.50 This program provided long-term immigrants
who had arrived as children and lacked a criminal record with a general
policy of enforcement forbearance and a path to employment without
risk to the immigrants—often referred to as “Dreamers”—or risk to
employers of DACA beneficiaries.51 The Obama administration
justified this program with reference to precedents supporting such
agency forbearance and prioritization of activities, as well as statutory
language providing this latitude.52 And in explaining the policy, the
administration discussed the children’s plight and argued that DACA
would be sound policy and comply with the law.53
In its 2017 reversal, DHS relied only on a brief Attorney General
statement rooted substantially in constitutional notions that DACA
was illegal.54 The agency did not engage with the policy or factual
underpinnings of the earlier policy, nor did it address doctrines
previously relied upon to justify prioritizing enforcement against
dangerous immigrants. By not justifying its shift with expertise-rooted
rationales, DHS eliminated its strongest possible grounds for seeking
judicial deference. This policy change, like several other 2017 and 2018
agency actions that sidestepped the usual policy-change analytical
hurdles, was judicially rejected in several substantially similar decisions
for being rooted in legal error, lacking adequate explanation, and for
flunking consistency doctrine in failing to fully engage with earlier
factual considerations.55 This and other judicial analyses of abnegationbased policy shifts are analyzed in greater depth below.
50. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH
RESPECT TO INDIVIDUALS WHO CAME TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHILDREN 1 (2012) (“By this
memorandum, I[, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano,] am setting forth how, in the
exercise of our prosecutorial discretion, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should
enforce the Nation’s immigration laws against certain young people . . . .”).
51. Id. at 1–3 (describing the DACA program).
52. See Regents, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 1019–22 (describing exercises of deferred action by
immigration officials prior to the DACA program, noting that such prosecutorial deference
“began ‘without express statutory authorization’ but has since been recognized by the Supreme
Court as a ‘regular practice,’” and has been explicitly referenced by Congress in legislation
(quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 (1999))).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 1025–26 (noting that the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision to
rescind DACA was based on a short letter from Attorney General Jeff Sessions to the Secretary,
opining that the program was an unconstitutional exercise of executive authority).
55. See, e.g., Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding that the
decision to rescind DACA “appear[ed] to be arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion”
because it: (1) “rest[ed] on the erroneous legal conclusion that the DACA program is unlawful
and unconstitutional”; (2) “rest[ed] on the erroneous factual premise that courts have determined
that the DACA program violates the Constitution”; and (3) was “internally contradictory”);
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EPA repeatedly utilized statutory-abnegation rationales in a
series of 2017 and 2018 regulatory reversals. In late 2017, EPA
proposed to repeal its Clean Power Plan (“CPP”).56 The CPP
regulation was finalized in 2015 under the Obama administration and
was designed to limit GHGs from power plants due to their climate
impacts.57 The CPP was issued following three Supreme Court
decisions that affirmed EPA authority to regulate GHGs, one of which
specifically referenced the Clean Air Act provision—Section 111(d)—
as providing EPA authority to regulate existing power-plant
emissions.58 Furthermore, EPA had, in a separate finalized and
judicially upheld rulemaking, extensively documented climate science
and associated health and environmental “endangerments” resulting
from GHG emissions and climate change.59 That finding, plus the
Court’s precedents, had been viewed by EPA as triggering a
mandatory duty to regulate, due to “shall” language in Section 111(d).60
It justified its consideration of power plants’ use of fuel shifts and
trading strategies—sometimes referred to as “generation shifting” or
regulating “beyond or outside the fenceline”—in setting its CPP

Regents, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 1037 (“[P]laintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims that: (1) [DHS’s]
decision to rescind DACA was based on a flawed legal premise; and (2) government counsel’s
supposed ‘litigation risk’ rationale is a post hoc rationalization and would be, in any event,
arbitrary and capricious.”).
56. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (Final Rule) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
60) [hereinafter “Clean Power Plan”].
57. Id. at 64,663.
58. See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423–25 (2011) (referring to
EPA’s section 111(d) power to regulate power-plant greenhouse-gas emissions); William W.
Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 2017 WISC. L. REV. 1037,
1071–81 [hereinafter Buzbee, Federalism Hedging] (reviewing the cases and regulatory actions
leading to the creation of the CPP).
59. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, supra note 58, at 1075 (reviewing the Endangerment
Finding).
60. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 56, at 64,707–25 (summarizing the legal history and
basis for the design of the CPP). In the CPP, EPA explained its approach as consistent with past
rulemakings that required pollution control in light of each industries’ particular attributes. See
id. at 64,703 (noting that previous section 111(d) actions were “necessarily geared toward the
pollutants and industries regulated,” and stating that the present regulation similarly “tak[es] into
account the particular characteristics of carbon pollution, the interconnected nature of the power
sector and the manner in which EGUs [electric generating units] are currently operated”). It
emphasized that power plants were already adjusting pollution levels through utilization of the
integrated energy grid. See id. at 64,725 (noting that “fossil fuel-fired EGUs are taking actions to
reduce emissions of both non-GHG air pollutants and GHGs” and that “[t]hese measures in
aggregate result in the replacement of higher-emitting generation with lower- or zero-emitting
generation, reflecting the integrated nature of the electricity system”).
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pollution targets, due to EPA’s policy of considering the particular
attributes of the industry being regulated.61 Since power plants operate
in the setting of an interconnected and integrated grid and, under statelaw regimes, were already reducing GHG emissions and meeting
energy demands cost-effectively through off-site strategies, EPA
thought it should take them into account in devising the CPP.62 EPA
also referenced the electric-power sector’s arguments in the mid-2000s
that EPA, when potentially acting under Section 111(d) to regulate
mercury emissions, could and should take into account such
interconnectedness and the flexibility it provided.63 In early 2017, at the
tail end of the Obama administration, EPA denied a series of petitions
to reconsider the CPP.64 EPA looked at underlying conditions, trends,
and costs, and it found that its CPP conclusions remained sound.65 EPA
found that clean-energy trends had in fact accelerated more than
expected and at lower cost than initially predicted in the CPP.66

61. See id. at 64,677 (discussing the interconnected grid system utilized by the power-utility
sector); id. at 64,760–79 (justifying EPA’s ability to utilize the “beyond the source” approach using
canons of statutory interpretation, and arguing that the power-utility sector’s reliance on the
interconnected grid system warrants such an approach).
62. See id. at 64,761 (“[T]he EPA’s interpretation is . . . reasonable [in part
because] . . . [f]ossil fuel-fired EGUs are already implementing the measures in [building blocks
2 and 3] for various reasons, including for purposes of reducing CO2 emissions.”); see also Gabriel
Pacyniak, Making the Most of Cooperative Federalism: What the Clean Power Plan Has Already
Achieved, 29 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 301, 320–25, 334–40 (2017) (reviewing EPA’s statutory
authority to enact the CPP, citing state commenters’ requests that the CPP build upon already
existing state-level regulation, and discussing the importance of providing states and power plants
with flexibility in implementing such regulation).
63. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 56, at 64,696–97 (discussing a 2005 regulation of
mercury emissions from power plants, Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606, 28,620 (May 18, 2005) (Final
Rule) (the “Mercury Rule”), and EPA’s view at the time that it should set emissions levels based
on a “combination of the cap-and-trade mechanism and the technology needed”). In response to
a challenge to the CPP filed in the D.C. Circuit, briefs further referenced industry support for
trading-based regulation under section 111(d). See Respondent EPA’s Final Brief at 12, 30–34,
West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2016) (noting that the CPP is “based on an
analysis of what power plants are already doing,” explaining that state regulatory programs,
industry actors, and other CAA programs already rely on “generation-shifting,” and citing past
industry support for the “Mercury Rule,” which promoted a “cap-and-trade” scheme similar to
that utilized by the CPP).
64. EPA, BASIS FOR DENIAL OF PETITIONS TO RECONSIDER AND PETITIONS TO STAY THE
CAA SECTION 111(D) EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
COMPLIANCE TIMES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS 1 (2017) [hereinafter “EPA,
BASIS FOR DENIAL”].
65. See id. at 22 (“[T]rends toward low- and zero-emitting energy, upon which the CPP
builds, continue unabated . . . .”).
66. Id.
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Under new leadership following the election of President Trump,
EPA proffered a different read of the statute, focusing on claims of
hardships imposed on the regulated industry.67 EPA claimed
consistency with an earlier EPA “inside the fenceline” approach to
sources regulated under Section 111(d).68 Based on EPA’s new view of
the Clean Air Act’s “text, context, structure, purpose, and legislative
history, as well as with the Agency’s historical understanding and
exercise of its statutory authority,” EPA said (in its proposed repeal)
that the “CPP exceed[ed] the EPA’s statutory authority” and was “not
within the bounds of our statutory authority.”69 EPA initially proposed
a complete repeal of the CPP, but without committing to any

67. EPA actually just alluded to claims of such hardships and costs, neither providing citation
to record evidence or particular comments from the rulemaking process nor stating its own
conclusion about such claims. See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,038 (Oct. 16, 2017)
(Proposed Rule) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (stating that “numerous states, regulated
entities and other stakeholders warned that the CPP threatened to impose massive costs on the
power sector and consumers”). It also did not address contradictions between these alleged
hardships and contrary conclusions in the agency’s 2017 reconsideration-petition denial. See EPA,
BASIS FOR DENIAL, supra note 64 (noting accelerating clean-energy trends and lower-thananticipated associated costs).
68. See CPP Repeal Proposal supra note 2, at 48,037 (“[T]he EPA . . . is proposing to
interpret the phrase ‘best system of emission reduction’ in a way that is consistent with the
Agency’s historical practice of determining a BESR by considering only measures that can be
applied to or at the source.”). Whether this claim about EPA’s “historical practice” is accurate
has been disputed due to past proposals about how to regulate power plants, past section 111(d)
regulation, and other trading-based regulatory actions. See Comments of the Natural Resources
Defense Council on EPA’s Proposed Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 8–10 (Apr. 26, 2018) (documenting
past actions contradicting EPA’s “historical practice” claim).
69. See CPP Repeal Proposal supra note 2, at 48,036, 48,038. In later discussion, EPA
discussed its new authority as based on the “best construction” of the statute, indicating that it
perhaps had not fully surrendered its past authority. Id. at 48,039–43. Nonetheless, it repeatedly
asserts that the CPP “exceed[ed]” EPA’s authority to regulate, justifying this view by relying on
textual interpretations of section 111, review of its legislative history, analysis of prior rulemaking
practice under that section, broader statutory context, and claimed “serious” economic impacts
of the CPP approach. See id. at 48,039–43. In 2017, the agency viewed the statute as mandating an
“inside-the-fenceline” approach, stating its regulation “must be something that physically or
operationally changes the source itself, and that is taken at or applied to individual, particular
sources.” Id. at 48,043. “Generation shifting,” as earlier embraced in the CPP, was described as
“fail[ing] to comply with this limitation.” Id. at 48,042. Thus, most statements reveal an
abnegation rationale that the EPA was prohibited from regulating in the form chosen in the CPP.
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replacement rule.70 It cited a few consistency-doctrine precedents and
sought to limit public comment.71
In offering this new, power-limiting read of the statute, EPA did
not cite other relevant statutory language previously viewed as key to
EPA’s power, past cases relied upon, or past rulemakings EPA had
analyzed in 2015.72 It also ignored EPA’s detailed 2014, 2015, and 2017

70. CPP Repeal Proposal, supra note 2 (“The EPA has not determined the scope of any
potential rule under CAA section 111(d) to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from
existing EGUs, and, if it will issue such a rule, when it will do so and what form that rule will
take.”).
71. Id. (“[T]he EPA is not soliciting comments on such information [regarding a possible
replacement rule] with this proposal.”); id. at 48,039 (citing precedent to support the proposition
that “the EPA has inherent authority to reconsider, repeal, or revise past decisions to the extent
permitted by law so long as the Agency provides a reasoned explanation”).
72. For example, the Obama administration devoted considerable attention to why it viewed
its CPP strategies as consistent with past actions. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text
(reviewing these referenced past actions). Actions by the Trump administration make general
claims of returning to a prior approach, but they either do not address the particular actions found
relevant by the Obama administration or provide only a passing reference to those actions.
Compare Clean Power Plan, supra note 56, at 64,707–25 (Obama EPA action, identifying past
similarly rationalized regulatory actions and also state-level regulation reducing power-plant
emissions), with CPP Repeal Proposal, supra note 2, at 48,037, 48,039–41 (Trump EPA action,
claiming to return to past “historical practice” but not addressing the actions analyzed in the
Obama-administration analysis, apart from alluding to an action rejected “on other grounds”
without analyzing the similarities of the action to the CPP); Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline
Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746,
44,752 (Aug. 31, 2018) (Proposed Rule) [hereinafter ACE Rule Proposal] (to be codified 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 60) (same). Regarding that action, the “Mercury Rule,” supra note 63,
Trump’s EPA erroneously claims that the “rule was still ultimately predicated on measures taken
at the level of individual sources.” Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,041 n.14 (Oct. 16,
2017) (Proposed Rule) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). The 2005 “Mercury Rule” in fact set a
pollution cap based on emissions “across the field of units” and proposed to use a cap-and-trade
strategy. 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,617 (explaining EPA’s use of a “cap-and-trade” program); id. at 28,619
(explaining setting the cap based on emissions “across the field of units”). Similarly, the Obama
administration relied substantially on the statutory term “system” as justifying regulation that
looked beyond technology or on-site pollution-reduction methods. Carbon Pollution Emission
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662,
64,763–78 (Oct. 23, 2015) (Final Rule) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (discussing the statutory
term “system” and linked language and law to justify setting emissions levels based on more than
facility-specific measures). The Trump administration leapfrogged past that analysis without
actually analyzing most of the Obama EPA discussion to focus on earlier actions, even under
earlier versions of the Clean Air Act and different provisions, and then proffered a new view that
read “system” and section 111(d) to justify a source- and technology-focused mode of regulation,
even considering prohibitions on state use of trading and averaging between sources. ACE Rule
Proposal at 44,751–54, 44,765–68. The agency’s new strategy and statutory view omitted
engagement with the CPP interpretation being rejected. See also EPA, BASIS FOR DENIAL, supra
note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the Trump EPA’s 2017 findings about unexpectedly
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studies of the electricity sector and state regulatory trends and
accomplishments, and nowhere considered or distinguished its own
earlier pro-CPP reasoning.73 Further, EPA under Trump leadership
did not compare or quantify environmental and health costs flowing
from the repeal proposal. While an accompanying Regulatory Impact
Statement contained some relevant numbers and comparisons, the
agency there too shifted its analytical framework.74 Finally, EPA’s 2017
proposed repeal did not discuss predicted increases in particulatematter pollution accompanying GHG emissions or the thousands of
additional predicted deaths if the CPP were abandoned, yet it was
under an obligation to consider “costs” and “health” impacts as part of
its analysis.75
In 2018, EPA made another regulatory proposal, this time issuing
a proposed replacement for the CPP, calling it the Affordable Clean
Energy (“ACE”) rule.76 The ACE proposal also included claims of past
illegal agency excess in issuing the CPP and claimed that its new “inside
the fenceline” approach was, in contrast, within its powers.77 In this
rapid shifts to cleaner energy and at lower costs than anticipated in the CPP).
73. The Proposed CPP Repeal ignored the 2017 EPA action, where it denied requests to
withdraw the CPP. In that action, EPA found that between 2015 and 2017, clean-energy trends
accelerated more than anticipated and with lower costs than predicted in 2015 in the CPP. See
EPA, BASIS FOR DENIAL, supra note 64, at 22 (noting that data published since the issuance of
the CPP “demonstrate[s] that the trends toward low- and zero-emitting energy . . . continue
unabated, and, in fact, have accelerated” and that “this information demonstrates that the state
emission targets required by the CPP can be achieved with significantly less impact on the
generation mix in the industry, and at much lower cost, than the EPA projected”).
74. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE REVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER
PLAN: PROPOSAL (2017).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012) (including within the definition of “standard of
performance” a requirement that the EPA Administrator “tak[e] into account the cost of
achieving [emission] reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact”). The
CPP discussed such avoided deaths. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 56, at 64,914. The repeal
proposal does not do so, despite section 111(a)’s mandate.
76. ACE Rule Proposal, supra note 72, at 44,748.
77. See id. (relying on legal analysis presented in EPA’s October 2017 proposed repeal of
the CPP, which asserted that the CPP’s “Best System of Emission Reduction” exceeded EPA’s
authority because it “us[ed] measures that applied to the power sector as a whole, rather than
measures that apply at and to, and can be carried out at the level of, individual facilities,” and
stating that the current rule “aligns with EPA’s statutory authority and obligation” because it
“evaluat[es] technologies or systems of emission reduction that are applicable to, at, and on the
premises of the facility for an affected source”). This new proposal, issued under new agency
leadership after the first administrator resigned following a wave of allegations of irregularities,
provided more engagement with underlying facts. See Barbash & Paul, supra note 43 (discussing
the unprecedented string of Trump-administration regulatory losses in the courts; flawed work by
Trump’s first EPA Administrator, Scott Pruitt; the lack of knowledgeable officials surrounding
political appointees; and views that EPA actions had improved under the leadership of Andrew
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action, it further reduced its claim of power, stating that it would no
longer set permissible levels of pollution but instead would provide
information and leave to the states the setting of emission levels on a
plant-by-plant basis.78 It is not clear if EPA viewed this second policy
change as legally required or as another option under the statute.79
In an unusual form of statutory abnegation, EPA also proposed in
several different actions to abandon the Clean Water Rule, a 2015 EPA
and Army Corps of Engineers rule that sought to reduce regulatory
uncertainty about what sorts of waters are subject to federal
jurisdiction as “waters of the United States.”80 The 2015 rule followed
a lengthy rulemaking, preparation of a metastudy of all peer-reviewed
scientific literature concerning types of waters and their functions and
“connectivity,” and then publication of this “Connectivity Report”
after opportunities for comment.81 The Clean Water Rule and
Connectivity Report both followed three Supreme Court decisions that
collectively raised many questions about the reach of federal power.82
Wheeler); Lisa Friedman, Trump Says He’ll Nominate Andrew Wheeler to Head the EPA, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/climate/trump-andrew-wheelerepa.html [https://perma.cc/KA84-BPKA] (discussing Wheeler and allegations of improprieties by
Pruitt).
78. See ACE Rule Proposal, supra note 72, at 44,748 (“EPA’s primary role in implementing
CAA section 111(d) is to provide emission guidelines that inform the development, submittal,
and implementation of state plans, and to subsequently determine whether submitted state plans
are approvable.”); id. at 44,750 (“[U]nder EPA’s new proposed regulations implementing CAA
section 111(d), which tracks with the existing implementing regulations in this regard, the
guideline document serves to ‘provide information for the development of state plans.’”); id. at
44,772–73 (discussing changed agency construction of “emission standard” and “standard of
performance”).
79. The ACE Rule Proposal discussion only elliptically acknowledges the policy change and
does not engage with EPA’s CPP discussion of its legal authority to set pollution caps that, in
turn, states, regions, and polluters would need to achieve.
80. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054,
37,054 (June 29, 2015) (Final Rule) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
81. EPA, EPA/600/R-14/675F, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS & WETLANDS TO
DOWNSTREAM WATERS: A REVIEW & SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ES-1 (2015).
82. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054.
The cases causing confusion about the scope of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) were: United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), which observed a broad definition of
navigable waters, based upon the broad integrity goals of the CWA; Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), which rejected a
claim of federal jurisdiction under the CWA over wholly intrastate, isolated waters such as ponds,
gravel pits, and seasonal waters due to their use as migratory-bird habitats; and Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), which caused legal uncertainties due to a plurality opinion by Justice
Scalia, which held the CWA to protect only a small category of waters; a swing concurrence by
Justice Kennedy, which more expansively protected waters based on their functions; and
dissenters who concluded that “waters of the United States” encompassed all wetlands and
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The 2017 and 2018 abnegation claims—and their associated
deregulatory actions regarding the Clean Water Rule and federally
protected “water[s] of the United States”—were unusual and a bit
indirect. EPA, following instructions from President Trump in an
executive memorandum,83 proposed in several actions to adopt a legal
interpretation of the reach of federal power based on a plurality
opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia in the Rapanos84 case.85 That opinion,
however, not only failed to garner a Court majority, it also ran counter
to views of five Justices—based on the dissent and Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence—about the sorts of waters that are protected and legal
rationales for their protection.86 The Scalia opinion’s narrow view of
federal power as limited to permanently flowing and continuously
connected waters also would have substantially cut back on the
coverage of the Clean Water Act. And the opinion’s test for
jurisdiction was rooted in dictionary-based parsing of the statute and
would have eliminated from federal jurisdiction most of the waters in
America’s West and Southwest—arguably, the very areas most in need
of protection.87 In those regions, arid conditions prevail and pollutants

tributaries that satisfied either Scalia’s or Kennedy’s standard due to five Justices supporting
protection of these waters. Id. at 792–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Clean Water Rule: Definition
of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,060–61 (discussing Court splits and resulting
law). For analysis of the Clean Water Rule and its durability, see generally Patrick Parenteau,
The Clean Water Rule: Not Dead Yet, 48 ENVTL. L. 377 (2018).
83. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017). The Order is titled
“Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the ‘Waters of the
United States’ Rule.” Id. at 12,497.
84. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
85. Intention to Review and Rescind or Revise the Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,532,
12, 532 (Mar. 6, 2017) (Notice of Intent).
86. Justice Kennedy and the four dissenters largely agreed with one another’s rationales for
protecting waters and the types of waters that would be protected, but the dissenters would have
gone further and also deferred more to regulators’ approaches. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 767–78
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the dissenters’ view that impermanent
streams are covered by the CWA); id. at 778–83 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(disagreeing with the breadth of the dissent’s interpretation of navigable waters and opining that
a “significant nexus” must exist between the bodies of water in question and “traditional”
navigable waters in order to bring those bodies under the jurisdiction of the CWA); id. at 807–10
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that, despite disagreement with Justice Kennedy’s “significant
nexus” formulation, this test will “probably not do much to diminish the number of wetlands
covered by the Act in the long run,” and stating that waters hence should be protected if “either
the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied”).
87. Id. at 730–37 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (arguing that commonsense dictionary
definitions, in addition to judicial precedent and the CWA’s own structure, call for limiting the
CWA’s jurisdiction over “navigable waters,” statutorily defined as “waters of the United States,”
only to “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water”).
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can concentrate or be disposed of in dry riverbeds that become crucial
waterbodies (or vehicles to carry toxins) during rare but heavy rains.
EPA’s proposed adoption of this view would involve abnegation
at several levels: it would reject how a majority of Justices in Rapanos
construed the nature and extent of federal power; it would reject
decades of contrary regulatory interpretations by EPA and the Army
Corps; it would run contrary to the Connectivity Report’s conclusions;
and it would disavow authority to protect waters in much of the nation,
even where quality water is most important. The first three 2017 and
2018 actions seeking to roll back the scope of protected waters,
however, did not mention the Connectivity Report, nor did the agency
analyze the impact of such a redefinition of protected waters.88
A supplemental notice issued in 2018 offered more by way of
justification and legal analysis, but it still vaguely claimed the illegality
of prior authority and skirted engagement with much of the Clean
Water Rule’s reasoning and science-based justification.89 A late 2018
proposal started a new notice-and-comment process to create a new
definition of federally protected “waters.”90 It mentioned the
Connectivity Report and discussed underlying cases. However,
although it proposed major policy changes and adopted a legal view
contrary to the legal views that EPA, the Army Corps, and the
88. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5,200, 5,202–03 (Feb. 6, 2018) (Final Rule) (emphasizing a
lack of associated costs and benefits due to claimed maintenance of the legal status quo of the
Clean Water Rule, which was finalized but not yet in effect due to judicial stays); Definition of
“Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 82
Fed. Reg. 55,542, 55,544–45 (Nov. 22, 2017) (Proposed Rule) (proposing an applicability date and
reiterating that agencies were not soliciting comment on the scope of the definition of “waters of
the United States” “[b]ecause the agencies propose to simply add the applicability date and
ensure continuance of the legal status quo and because it is a temporary, interim measure pending
substantive rulemaking”); Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of PreExisting Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 34,899, 34,903 (July 27, 2017) (Proposed Rule) (stating that agencies
were not seeking comment on pre-2015 rules or the “scope of the definition of ‘waters of the
United States’” until the second step of the two-step process).
89. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83
Fed. Reg. 32,227, 32,238 (July 12, 2018) (Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) (in a
substantially expanded justification for the policy shift, stating that, as “a result of the agencies’
review and reconsideration of their statutory authority and in light of the court rulings against the
2015 Rule[,] . . . the agencies are . . . concerned that the 2015 Rule lacks sufficient statutory
basis”). In places, this notice softens the abnegation claim, stating that the earlier rule “may” have
exceeded the agencies’ authority. Id. at 32,240; id. at 32,247 (noting that some commenters have
opined that the rule “may not effectively reflect the specific policy” of Congress regarding the
balance of federal and state authority under the Clean Water Act).
90. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4,154 (Feb. 14, 2019)
(Proposed Rule) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).
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Department of Justice embraced for a decade after Rapanos, the
proposal did not admit this major change or provide comparative
analysis of the change’s effects.91 Its language again appears to embrace
the view that it was required to utilize the Scalia approach,92 declined
the Kennedy approach and (erroneously) labeled it as the view of a
“single [J]ustice,”93 and declined to base the new definition on science
as set forth in the Connectivity Report. In fact, it asserted a new view
that “science cannot be used to draw the line between Federal and
State waters, as those are legal distinctions . . . .”94 This latest action
hence appears to view its abnegating, shrunken view of federal power
as legally mandated by the Scalia approach. At the same time, the
agency rejected most of the “significant nexus” approach set forth by
Justice Kennedy, despite that approach being substantially embraced
by a Court majority—Justice Kennedy and the four dissenters from the
Scalia plurality opinion.95
In another policy reversal, this time related to the reach of the
Clean Air Act’s regulation of hazardous air-pollutant emitters, EPA
disclaimed power it had asserted for twenty-two years. In 1995, EPA
interpreted the law to require that sources regulated as “major”
hazardous air-pollutant emitters under Section 112 of the Act
remained “major” once so classified.96 In 2018, however, a new EPA
memorandum did not just reverse that view but also claimed that EPA
had no such power under the Act.97 Despite decades of experience
91. See id. at 4,155–56.
92. Id. at 4,174 (quoting language from the plurality in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
723 (2006), which used words of limitation such as “only” and “necessary condition” to define
“waters of the United States”).
93. Id. at 4,196 (calling the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy in Rapanos the views of a
“single justice” and stating concerns that the Clean Water Rule “relies too heavily on
considerations that Justice Kennedy expresses”).
94. Id. at 4,176.
95. The dissenters and Justice Kennedy favorably commented on each other’s approaches,
but the dissenters did not fully join the Kennedy opinion because he called for an expanded
judicial role in assessing “significant nexus” waters; the dissenters called for more judicial
deference to regulatory judgments of EPA and the Army Corps. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text. In their discussion of types of protected waters and rationales, however, the
opinions had much in common. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (discussing the split
opinions in Rapanos and the creation of two majority positions regarding protected waters).
96. Memorandum from John S. Seitz, Dir., EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards, to Reg’l Offices 9 (May 16, 1995) (withdrawn Jan. 25, 2018) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
97. Memorandum from William L. Wehrum, Assistant Adm’r, EPA to Reg’l Air Div. Dirs.
3 (Jan. 25, 2018) (calling the previous policy “contrary to the plain language” of the statute
because the old “once in, always in” policy imposed a “temporal limitation” that Congress never
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under the old policy, the agency did not analyze the track record of the
longstanding view, its impact on air quality, or the changes that might
flow from the new statutory read.98 Both policies were stated in
interpretive documents issued without notice-and-comment process.
In another deregulatory carveout that quickly garnered attention,
EPA in late 2017 proposed to reverse its earlier regulation stating that
upgraded trucks installed with refurbished old diesel engines were
subject to regulation as “new” motor vehicles under the Clean Air
Act.99 Such trucks, known as “gliders,” emit more diesel-linked
pollutants and GHGs than completely new, state-of-the-art trucks with
new engines and designs, but gliders are far cheaper and, due to their
use of recycled components, are reported by their manufacturers to
result in fewer GHG emissions associated with their construction.100
EPA in 2016 had required gliders to meet new-truck emissions levels,
basing that judgment on a combination of statutory language, statutory
goals evident in the law, and assessment of pollution impacts.101
In 2017, EPA stated its new view that it “lack[ed] authority to
regulate” any aspect of the glider business—trucks, engines, or kits—
under the Act’s regulation of pollution from “new” motor vehicles.102
The agency argued that there was no congressional “specific intent” to
regulate “such a thing as a glider” and offered a somewhat convoluted
“whole law” analysis of the Act, parsing its amendments, its larger
context, and the roots of the Act’s definition of “new” as drawn from
an earlier statute.103 The agency concluded it “is implausible” that a
“new motor vehicle” would “include a vehicle comprised of new body
parts and a previously owned powertrain.”104 In a brief fallback, it
stated that “[a]t a minimum, ambiguity exists” and cited Chevron as an

placed in the CAA). For analysis of this shift, see Michelle West, “Once In, Always In” Now Out:
How the EPA is Reducing Regulations on Hazardous Air Pollutant Emitters, GEO. ENVTL. L.
REV. ONLINE (Mar. 3, 2018), https://gelr.org/2018/03/03/once-in-always-in-now-out-how-the-epais-reducing-regulations-on-hazardous-air-pollutant-emitters/ [https://perma.cc/C926-DLSP].
98. Memorandum from William L. Wehrum, supra note 97.
99. Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider Vehicles, Glider Engines, and Glider Kits,
82 Fed. Reg. 53,442 (Nov. 16, 2017) (Proposed Rule) [hereinafter Glider Repeal Proposal] (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1037, 1068).
100. Id.
101. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty
Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478 (Oct. 25, 2016) (Final Rule) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 9).
102. Glider Repeal Proposal, supra note 99, at 53,443–44.
103. Id. at 53,443–46.
104. Id. at 53,445–46.
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additional ground for its policy reversal.105 Although the notice
includes a brief discussion of the benefits of gliders, the agency does
not discuss or reveal overall emissions impacts or compare its new view
with the effects, findings, or reasoning of the earlier position.
Subsequent news stories and a letter sent by a group of senators to
EPA’s first Administrator under the Trump administration, Scott
Pruitt, raised numerous questions about this regulatory reversal’s
genesis, legality, and underlying factual and technical basis.106
The United States Department of Labor has similarly utilized an
abnegation strategy, relying on disclaimers of statutory authority under
the Fair Labor Standards Act as a justification for a 2017 rollback of a
finalized regulation designed to ensure that workers retain tips. Earlier
regulations mandated that “tipped employees retain all of their tips”
except in typical “tip pool[ing]” settings.107 In late 2017, however, the
department published a proposed rule that, contrary to the
department’s earlier rules and litigation defenses that had mixed
success, now stated it had “serious concerns that it incorrectly
construed the statute” and had exceeded “the scope” of its power.108 It
also stated concerns with the regulations “as a policy matter.”109 The
previous regulatory mandate limiting employer discretion in the
allocation of tips would, under the proposal, become a matter resolved
by contract—“a matter of agreement between the employer and
employees”—or “of state law.”110 It stated that it was “unable to
quantify” how customers would respond or how “reallocations of tips”
would affect previously tipped employees.111 Although the earlier

105. Id. at 53,446. The Glider Repeal Proposal at one point calls its prior reading “not the best
reading,” language also consistent with this new reading not being a clear answer to the “precise
question” under Chevron Step One. Id. at 53,445. Generally, however, its several pages of analysis
support the view that EPA was claiming it had no power to regulate gliders as new.
106. Letter from Senators Tom Carper and Tom Udall to Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, EPA (Mar. 12,
2018) (citing news stories and other studies questioning the genesis of the proposed rule change
and the integrity of the studies and industry materials relied upon); Eric Lipton, Steering Big Rigs
Around Emissions Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2018, at A1 (recounting meetings between a
company that builds gliders and Administrator Pruitt, effects of the rollback, and concerns of lowpolluting-truck manufacturers about the break for gliders).
107. Tip Regulations Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 82 Fed. Reg. 57,395,
57,395 (Dec. 5, 2017) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comments) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 531) (reviewing legislative, regulatory, and litigation history preceding the 2017
actions, and stating the Department of Labor’s new contrary legal view).
108. Id. at 57,399.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 57,396.
111. Id.
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regulation was still in effect and hence binding, the department also
reiterated an earlier 2017 policy of “nonenforcement” of the 2011
regulation to employers paying at least the full minimum wage and not
taking a “tip credit.”112 Subsequent news stories reported that the
department actually had prepared a quantified analysis of the
regulatory revision’s impacts that found that billions of dollars would
be reallocated from tipped workers to employers.113 After internal
disputes and White House consultation, they “removed the economic
transfer data altogether.”114 Ultimately, Congress intervened with a
statutory resolution contained in a massive omnibus spending bill.115
In late 2017, the Agricultural Marketing Service of the United
States Department of Agriculture proposed to withdraw a rule that had
regulated livestock handling, conditions, and care.116 This instance of
abnegation broadly disclaimed power to regulate animal welfare,
stating that such regulation was “not authorize[d],” the agency’s power
was “authoritatively prescribed” by the statute, and that it “lack[ed]
the power to tailor legislation to policy goals, however worthy, by
rewriting unambiguous statutory terms.”117 However, the agency
waffled a bit on the abnegation claim, in one instance calling “marketbased solutions . . . more appropriate.”118 The agency concluded its

112. Id. at 57,399.
113. Ben Penn, Labor Dept. Ditches Data Showing Bosses Could Skim Waiters’ Tips,
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 1, 2018, 6:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/labor-dept-ditches-data-showing-bosses-could-skim-waiters-tips [https://perma.cc/U99LWFNM]; see also text accompanying infra note 115 (citing other news stories discussing this
history).
114. Penn, supra note 113.
115. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. § 1201 (2018) (in an
appropriations rider, resolving the controversy by prohibiting employers from keeping
employees’ tips); see Noam Scheiber, Trump Administration Retreats on Tip-Sharing Plan in
Compromise, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/business/
economy/tipping-workers.html [https://perma.cc/ML86-CCQN] (reporting on the legislative
resolution); Lydia Wheeler, Spending Bill Prevents Employers from Pocketing Tips Under TipPooling Rule, HILL (Mar. 21, 2018, 8:57 PM EDT), https://thehill.com/regulation/379662spending-bill-prevents-employers-from-pocketing-tips-under-tip-pooling-rule [https://perma.cc/
X4GX-JZNB] (reporting that Democratic Senator Patty Murray reached a deal with Trump
Labor Secretary Alexander Acosta to add a spending-bill rider amending the Fair Labor
Standards Act to prevent employers, managers, or supervisors from pocketing workers’ tips
regardless of whether they earn gratuities on top of a full minimum wage).
116. National Organic Program (NOP); Organic Livestock and Poultry Practices—
Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. 59,988 (Dec. 18, 2017) (Proposed Rule) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt.
205).
117. Id. at 59,989.
118. Id. at 59,959 n.5.
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legal analysis with a fallback claim that its new interpretation should,
if the lack-of-power reasoning were rejected, be viewed as “a
permissible statutory construction.”119 As with several other
abnegation-based deregulatory actions, the agency did not discuss how
or whether animal welfare would change as a result, how consumers
might respond, or how producers might be affected, focusing instead
on consumer growth in organic markets and risks of “overly
prescriptive regulation.”120
In 2017, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), an
independent agency, took substantial steps toward abandoning the
“net neutrality” regulation promulgated in 2015.121 This proposal and
the later tentative final order relied on a weaker form of statutory
abnegation. The agency did not wholly disclaim power but instead
stated the earlier action was founded on unsound “statutory
construction” and claimed the new action was based on a “better
reading” of the statute.122 This new interpretation resulted in a
substantially reduced regulatory role for the FCC and left major
internet actors subject to reduced regulatory oversight.
Under a slightly different form of statutory abnegation, an agency
does not decisively disavow power but rather identifies ambiguity
about agency authority and then rationalizes a power retreat as wise in
light of such doubt. The Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) in
2017 and 2018 sought to abandon a 2016 rule governing methane
pollution linked to oil and gas extraction and related royalties.123 BLM
explained the reversal as partly due to the argument—originally made

119. Id. at 59,990.
120. Id.
121. Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,568 (June 2, 2017) (Proposed Rule) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 8, 20). The FCC revealed its likely policy-change choice and rationale
with a Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, but that document does not preclude further
comment and FCC adjustment. Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (1) (2017)
[hereinafter Restoring Internet Freedom Ruling].
122. Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. at 25,575.
123. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation;
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 7924 (Feb. 22, 2018) (Proposed
Rule) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3,160, 3,170) [hereinafter “BLM Waste Rule Rescission
Proposal”]; Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation;
Delay and Suspension of Certain Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,050 (Dec. 8, 2017) (Final Rule)
[hereinafter “BLM Waste Suspension Rule”]. A district court declared that the BLM Waste
Suspension Rule illegally circumvented numerous requirements of consistency doctrine, was
“untethered to evidence,” failed to allow meaningful opportunity for comments, and contained
internal logical inconsistencies. California v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1065–
66, 1071–72 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
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by industry challenging the rule but largely embraced by BLM in 2017
and 2018—that the 2016 rule “exceeded the BLM’s statutory
authority.”124 The agency stated that its earlier focus on “conservation
without regard to economic feasibility” was illegal, as was its
consideration of “environmental and societal benefits rather than . . .
resource conservation benefits alone.” Further, BLM claimed that it
had illegally engaged in pollution regulation delegated to EPA and the
states under other laws.125 After offering these statutory-abnegation
justifications for deregulating, BLM also pointed to alleged procedural
infirmities with the prior regulations and the risk of their rejection
under the APA.126 But the agency also explained its new deregulatory
move as a better choice, especially where no governing statute
mandated the 2016 regulation.127 In September of 2018, BLM issued a
final rule that more firmly relied on statutory-abnegation rationales,
again identifying several ways it claimed BLM had exceeded its
authority in 2016, including among them claims that it had previously
been excessively stringent.128 This last, far more limited form of
abnegation—a claim of illegality due to excessively ambitious
regulation and resulting hardship—involves something more akin to
doubts about the rigor of a particular choice as a rationale for a
regulatory change or reversal and, as a result, leads to less aggressive
agency assertion of power over those regulated.
B. Statutory-Abnegation Variants and Differences
In these instances of statutory abnegation, several common
elements are apparent. This section briefly identifies these elements.
1. Deregulatory Benefits. All are deregulatory actions or, in one
instance, an initial declination to act that followed an earlier contrary

124. BLM Waste Rule Rescission Proposal, supra note 123, at 7927–28.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 7927.
127. Id. at 7927–28.
128. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation;
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 49,184 at 49,185–86, 49,189–90
(Sept. 28, 2018) (Final Rule) [hereinafter “BLM Waste Rule Rescission Final”] (alleging that
BLM’s prior statutory interpretation was illegal, and adopting a more limited read of its powers
that it characterized as consistent with “longstanding” approaches and as avoiding conflict with
the Clean Air Act). BLM’s hybrid claim of illegal power that is linked to excess stringency states
that “by failing to give due regard to operator economics, the BLM exceeded its statutory
authority.” Id. at 48,189.
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statement about the agency’s power.129 Through statutory abnegation,
the agency reduces burdens imposed on regulated entities. All such
actions, other than the series of choices leading to Massachusetts v.
EPA, prominently tout their antiregulatory rationales, sometimes
including extensive language about the harms of regulation and agency
power. Such actions can involve a claim of no power to regulate in an
area at all, but they sometimes constitute a more action-specific
disavowal that the agency lacked power to regulate as it did. Sometimes
the assertion is written as though it is about a statutory line or mandate
prohibiting action but, in a broader context, seems to be nothing more
than a claim that the agency went too far under the facts or science.
2. Omitted Comparative Analysis of Legal Reasoning and Effects.
Recent uses of statutory abnegation are also notable in what they
decline to do or include. All involve the new statutory interpretation
disclaiming power but make only passing reference to the previous
contrary statutory views and the rationales that had explained them.
Most fail to provide an old–new comparison of effects of the
interpretive change, and most also place little or no weight on studies,
science, and facts previously discussed in regulating under the earlier
statutory interpretation. The new view’s benefits are discussed, at least
in broad terms, but the old approach’s benefits that would now be
foregone, and hence logically tallied as costs of the new regulatory
choice, receive little attention. Agencies’ also have not discussed the
track record under the earlier approach, actions in reliance on the
earlier policy, or other intervening changes.
These abnegation actions hence seem to reflect at least an implicit
view that the more the agency argues that it lacks power through
statutory abnegation, the less it needs to engage with other factors,
such as the basis for the earlier (but now abandoned) view of the
agency’s power or the underlying facts, data, or scientific contingencies
relevant to the old and new action.
3. A Textualist Narrative and Word-Driven Choice. To the extent
lengthy, small-type Federal Register documents can reveal a narrative,
the story told by abnegating agencies tends to be that the agency had
overreached, that it now respects the law’s limits, and that regulation
is often bad and economic activity will be enhanced by the deregulatory

129. The latter setting describes the agency history leading to Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497 (2007). See supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text.
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action. Several seem to parrot language, rationales, and methods that
microtextualist judges, such as the late Justice Antonin Scalia, would
utilize in interpreting statutes.130 Also consistent with some forms of
textualist methodology, these agencies devote little attention to the
impacts of their new interpretive choice, perhaps because it is
presented as obligatory and hence not a choice at all. All mention
compliance with executive orders calling for deregulation and reduced
regulatory costs. Even these narratives, however, often contain little
supporting documentation, sometimes citing no authority and at other
times only alluding generally to burdens that would have allegedly
resulted under the earlier policy, but without indicating the sources for
such claims.131 The agencies in most of these actions do not actually
scrutinize this information about regulatory effects or claimed
hardships, or offer the agency’s own conclusions, but they nonetheless
propose a broad regulatory rollback. A few late 2018 actions, however,
included a bit more attention to before-and-after comparisons of
regulatory effects.132

130. Textualism comes in numerous forms, with Justice Scalia favoring a form that tended to
focus upon a snippet of language, often with little attention to immediately surrounding language,
larger structure, or statutory indications of policy goals, even when stated in the text. For an indepth critique, see VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 103–34
(2016), reviewing Scalia’s form of textualism as “petty textualism.” As a shorthand, I refer to such
a narrow focus as “microtextualism.” In a less developed strain of cases, Justices mostly utilizing
a textualist methodology have expanded their focus, generally en route to rejecting an agency’s
new claim of authority. See infra notes 141–46 (discussing these cases); see also Buzbee, The
Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1373–75 (discussing the “major questions” canon and its
implications for deregulatory policy changes). In a growing line of Supreme Court opinions
exhibiting a more integrative and functional mode of statutory analysis, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Kagan, in opinions speaking for the Court, analyze statutory texts with attention to all
statutory signals but generally maintain a focus on the text itself; they simply do not focus as
narrowly as Justice Scalia did in some of his most famous “new textualism” decisions. Id. at 1365–
67. Justice Kagan employed this form of textualism in a recent case addressing the National Park
Service’s jurisdiction over hovercraft use on an Alaskan river. See generally Sturgeon v. Frost, 139
S. Ct. 1066 (2019) (reviewing operative text, surrounding language, definitions, other regulatory
powers in parks outside Alaska, other legislation regulating the same area, the history of the
legislation and compromises, legislative history, and the consequences of alternative
interpretations, concluding that the agency lacked power to regulate).
131. See, e.g., CPP Repeal Proposal, supra note 2, at 48,038, 48,042 (referring to costs, harms,
and energy-system risks under the CPP, but without attribution or stating the agency’s
conclusions about such claims and not discussing the change from a virtually opposite agency
position in CPP documentation or the 2017 EPA, BASIS FOR DENIAL, supra note 64).
132. See, e.g., ACE Rule Proposal, supra note 72 and accompanying text; supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
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4. Initial Declinations to Act, Distinguished. Another category of
abnegation likely exists but is hard to identify and raises a different set
of issues; it hence is excluded here, apart from this limited
identification. Agencies frequently need to make decisions based on
facts and law about whether they should, for the first time, assert
jurisdiction over or impose regulations on a source of risk. They may
decline to do so out of concern about a lack of statutory authority, or
perhaps concern about challenges to their authority, or any number of
other reasons usually linked to agency choices in a world of many
options, demands, and limited resources. But without the wrinkle of
policy change, the agency generally has no reason or need to explain a
choice not to act. The Supreme Court in State Farm133 saw this
distinction as important, rejecting the government’s attempt to justify
a policy reversal as so much like an agency choice not to act as to
deserve similarly minimal or nonexistent judicial scrutiny.134
But as the State Farm Court noted, the two are different. With an
initial choice not to act, there is unlikely to be a body of fact-finding
related to, or scientific study tailored to, the regulatory action
ultimately declined. As a result, there may be no written documents
declaring or explaining an abnegation rationale or whether a different
view is tenable. In fact, such action is often no action at all. In addition,
there are no regulatory track records, ripple effects, or subsequent
reliance interests associated with initial choices not to act. Abnegation
would deliver no new regulatory relief, and hence there is little
opportunity for agency credit claiming. Furthermore, such an initial
choice not to claim power or act triggers a substantially different body
of doctrine, much linked to the “committed to agency discretion”
exclusion from judicial review under the APA.135 This body of law
grants agencies broad, and possibly unreviewable, discretion in how
they choose to deploy limited resources and choose among an array of
possible actions. This Article therefore generally puts to the side
possible abnegation rationales for agencies continuing to take no
action.

133. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, (1983).
134. Id. at 41–43.
135. See generally Ronald Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74
MINN. L. REV. 689, 702–34 (1990) (discussing unreviewability doctrines).
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5. Chevron Policy Change, Distinguished. Although the principles
of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.136
might seem to support statutory abnegation, that case did not involve
abnegation at all.137 Where an agency decides to adjust the stringency
of its regulation or identify new permissible means for compliance with
a legal edict (be it statutory or regulatory) but does not disclaim its
power, there is no abnegation. Instead, the agency is basically
embracing what it will claim is a better regulatory means as a matter of
policy choice. In fact, an agency identifying a new means for
compliance will often be claiming an expanded range of power in the
sense that the agency is claiming statutory authority to regulate in
several different ways. That the action may result in some sort of
regulatory relief, perhaps in the form of reduced compliance costs,
does not make it a form of abnegation. The agency is not denying that
it has legal authority, even though it may be revising policy and
reducing regulatory burdens.
6. Changed Regulatory Stringency, Distinguished. Another
common sort of action often characterized as deregulatory is neither
an example of statutory abnegation nor even an example of policy
change. Nonetheless, by way of contrast, brief analysis will help explain
why statutory abnegation is different. Agencies frequently are
obligated by statutes to assess some underlying science or social
conditions and, depending on their factual findings, adjust regulatory
obligations. So, for example, agencies will assess air quality and, as a
result, change a jurisdiction’s legal category.138 Regulation might also
hinge in part on assessments of cutting-edge technological
capabilities.139 Or, agencies may examine a product’s risk and adjust its
labeling, licensing, or marketing scheme.140 Although such actions can
make a massive difference in resulting regulatory obligations—

136. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
137. See id.
138. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7410 (2012) (setting forth interrelated provisions creating an
“ambient air quality standard” scheme, state obligations, and linked classifications of their status).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012) (setting forth a program regulating emitters of hazardous air
polluters and requiring achievement of various benchmarked forms of “best” achievable
performance).
140. See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (describing such regulation in a
challenge to claimed preemptive impacts of regulatory action); David A. Kessler & David C.
Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96
GEO. L.J. 461 (2008) (reviewing FDA roles and food and drug laws’ interplay with common-law
regimes).
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potentially adding burdens or easing requirements—they do not
necessarily involve any changed view of the agency’s statutory
authority or any policy change. Static legal criteria simply can lead to
changing regulatory obligations in light of new science, data, and
conditions. This is a common source of changed regulatory obligations.
Hence, so-called regulatory rollbacks can sometimes involve neither
abnegation nor policy change at all.
7. Past Abnegation, Effects on Future Regulatory Action, and the
“Major Questions” Canon. Actions that involve past abnegation, in
the sense of previously disclaimed power and then a new assertion of
authority, are also worth noting. Agencies will, at times, quite explicitly
seek to regulate a source of risk that had earlier been unregulated,
sometimes due to earlier agency disavowals of authority to regulate. A
paradigmatic and often cited example is discussed in the Brown &
Williamson decision.141 FDA had previously declined to regulate
tobacco products, and Congress had enacted a number of laws
specifically authorizing particular types of regulation of tobacco
products.142 When FDA reexamined its authority in light of new
revelations of industry practices regarding tobacco products’ design
and effects and, as a result, newly claimed power to regulate tobacco
marketing, that earlier abnegation—called “disavowal” in the case—
was significant to the Supreme Court’s subsequent rejection of FDA’s
power.143 In addition, a difference among the Justices concerned
whether FDA’s earlier declinations to act had been factually
contingent—a “contingent disavowal”—or a complete abnegation.144
Such circumstances involve a new claim of power that was either
never asserted or was the subject of earlier abnegation. These changing
claims about agency power have at times triggered the growing body
of doctrine known as the “power canon” or “major questions” canon,
under which the Supreme Court has declined to show the usual
deference to agencies, reviewing the new claim of power skeptically.145
141. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
142. Id. at 126–30, 143–59 (reviewing FDA’s 1995 and 1996 tobacco actions, as well as other
congressional actions regarding tobacco and the sequence of FDA actions and officials’
statements about FDA’s power to regulate tobacco).
143. Id. at 144–59.
144. Id. at 186–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reviewing reasons the agency’s past views were factbased and could change).
145. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1933 (2017)
(analyzing and criticizing the “major questions” cases, labeled the “power canons,” for how they
reorder the relationships of the three branches and have an antiregulatory bias).
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In this converse setting involving past abnegation preceding the new
power claim, the Court’s more rigorous form of judicial review is quite
overtly antiregulatory in its rationale and effects. The fact of past
abnegation and, it appears, sometimes simple past declinations to act,
can together be part of the rationale for later skeptical and
undeferential judicial scrutiny. As a result, current abnegation might,
in effect, set up—perhaps by design—later judicial resistance to a new
assertion of agency power.146 This may partly explain why agencies
utilize abnegation as a rationale for deregulation despite the
disadvantages of doing so. This Article turns now to analyzing this
doctrinal disadvantage, exploring why we nonetheless see such
frequent reliance on abnegation, and assessing statutory abnegation as
a normative matter.
II. THE DOCTRINAL ANSWER TO STATUTORY ABNEGATION
Given the prevalence of statutory abnegation to justify
deregulatory actions, especially during 2017 and 2018, one might
expect a strong doctrinal foundation for such a move. However, as is
apparent when assessed by reviewing courts in light of governing law,
the bare statutory-abnegation claims rolled out during the Trump
administration lack doctrinal support.147 This is not to claim that an
agency could not, at times, correctly identify a power limitation it
previously disregarded. The point here is that, as utilized and explained
in most of the agency actions reviewed above, the skimpy reasoning
and minimal factual engagement accompanying abnegation claims
appears to be in outright violation of several strains of law governing
judicial review of agency action, especially regarding policy change.
Unless several longstanding, foundational judicial-review frameworks
are substantially revised, abnegation strategies that lack
accompanying, necessary comparative analysis are unlikely to meet
success in the courts.
A. Assessing Proffered Justifications for Statutory Abnegation
Statutory abnegation has been justified by agencies or
Department of Justice litigators with several rationales. This Part
explores these and additional possible justifications for such a strategy,
146. For other explanations for the legally dubious abnegation strategy, including the related
long-shot goal of securing judicial ratification of abnegation, see infra Part III.
147. They are “bare” due to the lack of analysis of other required antecedents for legal policy
change. Those requirements follow in this section.
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with a focus on the likelihood of success upon eventual judicial review.
It then broadens the perspective, considering incentives and victories
that might be more political and motivated by a desire to deliver quick
relief for regulatory targets, even if eventually rejected in the courts.
1. Presidential Edicts and Direction. Most agencies utilizing
statutory abnegation explain their regulatory reconsideration as, at
least in part, an act of compliance with a president’s deregulatory
agenda. This was true with the Bush administration’s declinations to
act regarding climate change,148 and more recently in agency responses
to President Trump’s priorities, especially as set forth in his Executive
Order 13,771.149 That order requires all agencies and departments to
eliminate two regulations for each new regulation and also ensure
regulatory actions do not result in any new net regulatory costs.150
Presidents expect all agencies to comply with executive orders. Hence,
agency reference to governing executive orders is nothing out of the
ordinary.
Nonetheless, executive orders, both by their terms and due to
constitutional structure, cannot justify violations of what is required by
the Constitution or by enabling legislation governing an agency’s
actions. Statutes and the Constitution are hierarchically above such
orders, creating binding law. In addition, an order falls before extant
promulgated regulations; until revised through another rulemaking
process, they remain binding law, as long established by United States
ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy.151 Order 13,771, like past orders,
explicitly states it is subject to other governing statutory and legal
requirements.152 Such presidential direction hence can explain an
agency’s consideration or proposal of deregulatory moves, and perhaps
has been viewed as something that will provide additional support
upon judicial review due to a president’s political accountability. An
executive order would not, however, excuse violations of law, a lack of
factual support, or actions that in some other respect are arbitrary and
capricious. No case or law gives a president’s imprimatur via an
executive order some special authority or power to save an agency
action that otherwise lacks adequate justification or preceding

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text.
Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339, 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
Id.
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265–68 (1954).
Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed., Reg. at 9,340.
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process.153 If anything, recent cases perhaps are stronger in their
rejection of agency actions that appear to be little more than agency
capitulation to a president’s edict; courts instead look for agencies to
observe all process required by the APA, enabling acts, and “reasoned
decisionmaking” precedents, including basic tenets of “hard look
review” and the consistency-doctrine cases reviewed below.154
2. Change and Chevron. As mentioned above, some abnegating
agencies cite Chevron as giving agencies latitude to revamp their
regulatory approaches, sometimes linking that discussion to President
Trump’s avowed goal to reduce regulatory burdens.155 The case is also
sometimes cited as a fallback argument that, if the new statutory
interpretation fails, the agency’s new interpretation should be upheld
as at least a reasonable or a permissible choice.156 Chevron certainly is
a critical endorsement of agency policy reassessment. It provides
agencies with some additional space to make statutory and policy
judgments if there is a gap, silence, or ambiguity, with judicial
deference in such settings required under the Supreme Court’s
Chevron Two-Step. At Step One of Chevron, an agency and court must
agree on a statutory interpretation if Congress has addressed the
“precise question at issue.”157 At Step Two, however, the presence of a
gap, silence, or ambiguity translates into policymaking discretion to be
wielded by the agency due to its delegated role and expertise. Courts
must defer to a “reasonable” or permissible interpretation.158
153. See David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age
of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1108–14 (2008) (discussing the role of the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) and questions of legitimacy and
politicization); Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 327–30,
365–67 (2014) (discussing and questioning such regulatory-oversight orders’ legality as written
and applied).
154. See infra Part III.D (discussing cases reviewing abnegation-based deregulatory actions).
155. EPA frequently cites it in actions, see supra notes 56–106 and accompanying text, but
other agencies making policy changes also cite it for support. See, e.g., National Organic Program
(NOP); Organic Livestock and Poultry Practices—Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. 59,988, 59,989 (Dec.
18, 2017) (Proposed Rule) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205) (discussing a Department of
Agriculture policy reversal referencing Chevron). It appears that agencies making policy changes
during the Trump administration tend to cite one or more executive orders by way of explanation
or justification. A Westlaw search of Federal Register notices after 2016 (shortly before President
Trump was inaugurated) shows over 2500 agency references to such orders.
156. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980
(2005) (upholding reasonable interpretation of FCC under Chevron).
157. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
158. See id. at 843.
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But most statutory-abnegation rationales for deregulation involve
agencies claiming that they could not, in conformity with law, act as
they previously did. Agency language explaining statutory abnegation
often seems to describe the agency as acting within, and hence
constrained by, a Chevron Step One context.159 Because Step One
requires the agency and court to agree, and with the agency receiving
no deference, Chevron at Step One provides no additional room or
judicial deference for the agency’s reinterpretation of the governing
statutory language.160 So Chevron is one of many cases embracing the
possibility of policy change, but it actually provides no doctrinal
mileage for an agency’s claim that it lacks power to act as it did
previously. If the action genuinely involves a question that can only be
viewed as implicating Step One, then the agency and reviewing court
must agree on what the statute requires.161 If there is Step Two “space,”
then an abnegation claim would be in error because the agency
disclaiming power would mistakenly be asserting a lack of interpretive
and policy options.162 An erroneous—and thus illegal—agency claim of
legal constraint, like any other erroneous statutory interpretation by
an agency, requires judicial rejection.163
3. Litigation Risk. Most agencies pursuing a statutory-abnegation
strategy focus on their new interpretation, explain it, and in broad
terms criticize the old view as untenable. Some agencies reject the old
view in part due to the argument that it is unlikely to receive deference
from the courts, would be vulnerable upon review, or simply would
likely lead to litigation that the agency would prefer to avoid.164 This

159. See id. at 842–45.
160. See id. In fact, the general assumption is that agencies view it as advantageous to argue
that their policy choice, and underlying statutory interpretations, fall within Chevron Step Two
because it provides an agency room for multiple permissible choices and calls for judicial
deference. See infra notes 226–30 and accompanying text.
161. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45.
162. See Hemel and Nielson, supra note 23 (discussing Prill doctrine); Michael Herz, Chevron
is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1880, 1885–86 (2015) (agreeing with
Professor Peter Strauss regarding Chevron “space” and Skidmore “weight,” but suggesting a unity
of deference frames in the focus on ascertaining statutory meaning as part of an analysis of agency
power).
163. In the DACA cases, DHS’s erroneous views about its powers led to a string of judicial
losses. See supra notes 49–55, and infra notes 335–41 and accompanying text (discussing the
actions and judicial rejections).
164. For a final-rule withdrawal substantially predicated on litigation risks of the earlier
action, see Scope of Sections 202(a) and (b) of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 82 Fed. Reg.
48,594, 48,596–99 (Oct. 18, 2017) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 201) (Final Rule) (withdrawing an
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litigation-risk rationale raises quite different issues and has led to
different judicial responses.165
4. Consistency Doctrine’s Constraints. Some agencies pursue an
abnegation strategy with supplementary justification.166 They offer a
more robust legal explanation that acknowledges that, in addition to
the issues of interpreting the relevant enabling act, agencies proposing
a policy shift also must provide the analysis required by law governing
policy change and by consistency doctrine. This is most evident in
several late 2017 and 2018 actions by EPA.167 In addition to offering an
abnegating interpretation of the statute, agencies cite and sometimes
quote from two of the four major modern consistency-doctrine cases.
Most Trump-administration agencies, however, appear to view citation
to cases acknowledging the possibility of agency policy change as
legally sufficient, failing to address the procedural and analytical
hurdles that consistency doctrine requires agencies to surmount to
make a successful policy change. This Part now explores these
requirements of consistency doctrine.
Agencies referring to this body of law often cite to a few lines from
the partial dissenting opinion of then-Associate Justice Rehnquist in
State Farm.168 This is, indeed, one of the key cases governing agency
interim final rule that had “enumerated unlawful practices” and discussing reasons the agency
viewed it as legally vulnerable). For cases discussing and rejecting the adequacy of the litigationrisk rationale for a deregulatory policy shift, see Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 420–33
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (rejecting the DACA reversal as rooted in legal error, illogical reasoning, and
inadequately analyzed litigation-risk arguments since either maintaining DACA or rescinding it
could lead to litigation, as well as failures to analyze factors required by consistency doctrine),
and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1037–46
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (discussing the inadequacy of a litigation-risk rationale among other infirmities
in the DACA rescission), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476, 500–03 (9th Cir. 2018) (reviewing a litigation-risk
claim and finding it pretextual and a post hoc rationale). See also infra note 165.
165. See, e.g., NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 463 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that
litigation risks and “serious doubts” rationales for a regulatory reversal are inadequate without a
more full justification, due to the risk that these rationales would insulate policy changes from
meaningful judicial review); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 215 (D.D.C. 2018) (same).
166. The cases parsed in this subpart are analyzed for their emphasis on contingent facts and
past reasoning in Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10. Here, they set the stage for
assessing the legal adequacy of statutory abnegation for regulatory reversals.
167. See supra Part I.A (discussing such abnegation-based actions and noting citations in some
actions to consistency doctrine).
168. The key language is in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For agencies citing
this language, see, e.g., Intention to Review and Rescind or Revise the Clean Water Rule, supra
note 85, at 12,532; see also Glider Repeal Proposal, supra note 99, at 53,443 and accompanying
text.
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policy changes and deregulatory shifts. Oddly, however, agencies citing
it and quoting Rehnquist do not include discussion of the case’s
majority ruling, which rejected a Reagan-era deregulatory action as
inadequately justified and stated what was required of agencies
proposing a policy change.169 Before turning to other consistency
precedents, State Farm’s two contrary facets are worth exploration.
State Farm is undoubtedly the foundational modern case
governing judicial review of agency policy change—in that case, in a
deregulatory direction.170 In addition to embracing “hard look review”
and articulating the requisites of “reasoned decisionmaking,” the
Court set forth the key elements of consistency doctrine.171 The Court
was confronted with the National Highway Traffic & Safety
Administration’s rejection of Standard 208, a regulation requiring cars
to be equipped with either airbags or automatic seatbelts. The agency,
however, only offered an explanation for one of the regulatory
reversals and argued for minimal judicial scrutiny of its actions because
they were deregulatory.172
The Court rejected this argument for minimal scrutiny,
emphasizing the need for an agency to confront its old policy and offer
an explanation for the change. The Court stated that when an agency
is “changing its course,” it is required to “supply a reasoned analysis
for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency
does not act in the first instance.”173 The Court easily determined that
abandoning the airbags option was arbitrary and capricious because
the agency “apparently gave no consideration whatever” to keeping
one of the safety strategies.174 As the Court stated, “[n]ot one sentence
of its rulemaking statement discusses the airbags-only option.”175
The State Farm Court declined to submit deregulatory action to
some less rigorous standard of review for several reasons. First, the
169. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
170. See generally State Farm, 463 U.S. 29.
171. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Story of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S.
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.: Law, Science and Politics in the Administrative
State, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 334 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (discussing the case’s
history and its importance).
172. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 30.
173. Id. at 42. The tail clause, stating more is required than “when an agency does not act in
the first instance,” rejects arguments that a deregulatory act is akin to an agency’s choice not to
act or regulate, a setting subject either to no judicial review or deferential review. See supra note
135 and accompanying text (discussing law on unreviewability).
174. See id. at 46.
175. Id. at 48; see also id. at 50–51 (stating that the “agency submitted no reasons at all”).
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APA made no such distinction.176 Second, the enabling act’s language
also provided no basis for treating differently initial regulatory actions
and rescissions of past actions.177 Moreover, the Court reasoned that
agency declinations to act—usually subject to minimal review—are
“substantially different” from an agency’s “revocation of an extant
regulation.”178 Such revocation “constitutes a reversal of the agency’s
former views as to the proper course.”179 The Court stated that a
“settled course of behavior embodies the agency’s informed judgment”
that the earlier action “will carry out the policies committed to it by
Congress.”180 This creates “at least a presumption that those policies
will be carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.”181
The Court acknowledged that agencies can seek to change policy,
as had already been long established.182 But the Court linked the
possibility of change not to politics, presidential priorities, or statutory
language, but to the need for “ample latitude to ‘adapt their rules and
policies to the demands of changing circumstances.’”183 It reiterated the
importance of “changing circumstances” and stated that the
presumption is “against changes in current policy that are not justified
by the rulemaking record.”184 Hence, the State Farm Court left room
for agency policy change but emphasized how past agency reasoning,
the record, and underlying circumstances would need to justify a
change.
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, which was labeled as part
concurrence and part dissent, suggested that a change of
administration and policy priorities could be among the grounds for an
agency policy shift. These factors could provide a “reasonable basis for
an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its

176. Id. at 41–42.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 41.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 41–42.
181. Id. (quoting Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807–08
(1973)). For analysis of statutory interpretation and judicial review of “longstanding” agency
interpretations, see generally Anita Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 1823 (2015). Krishnakumar calls for more rigorous review of agency change
if it is based on political factors but supports deference if it is rooted in changed circumstances,
expertise, and workability. Id. at 1877–79.
182. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42.
183. See id.
184. Id. (emphasis in original)
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programs and regulations.”185
Although Justice Rehnquist’s view did not gain majority support
in State Farm, it was quoted in the more recent FCC v. Fox186 case, in a
majority opinion that further fleshed out the general framework for the
permissible role of politics in agency policy change.187 The Court in Fox
found permissible the FCC’s changed approach to “fleeting obscenity”
on television. The splintered opinions in Fox render it difficult to
determine exactly what views garnered majority support.188 Change
does not, by itself, trigger any heightened scrutiny, but all Justices
agreed the agency would have to confront the old policy and explain
the changed new policy.189
The Justices in Fox differed on what had to be weighed. Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that agencies would have to
“show that there are good reasons for the new policy.”190 All Justices
appeared to agree on this need for “good reasons.”191 The Scalia
opinion ostensibly garnered majority support for most of its discussion,
but it left the law a bit uncertain due to pointed differences in the
Justice Kennedy concurrence; Kennedy’s vote was needed to make a
majority. The Scalia opinion stated the following, in language that has
become a common part of 2017 and 2018 statutory-abnegation
justifications: an agency “need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction
that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the
old one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute,
that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be
better.”192 The Court also acknowledged that because past policies will
185. Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As long as the agency
remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records
and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.”).
186. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
187. Id. at 515; see also Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 23, at 129–33 (analyzing additional
cases developing the law between State Farm and Fox).
188. See also Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 23, at 129 (highlighting doctrinal uncertainty
left by Fox).
189. Fox, 556 U.S. at 514.
190. Id. at 515.
191. The dissenters would have required more, but they indicated no disagreement with the
need for “good reasons.” Id. at 550–51 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 515. Justice Kennedy ostensibly joined this opinion, but his concurrence—which
was needed to make a Court majority—emphasized the need for factual justification and
expressed concern with agencies exercising “unbridled discretion” or ignoring contrary or
“inconvenient” facts, especially since many agency actions are built on “factual findings.” Id. at
536–37 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Encino Motorcars, LLC
v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) focused even more on facts. See infra notes 195–99 and
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tend to change the status quo by engendering reliance interests and
because prior agency actions often involve “factual findings,”
reviewing courts will tend to have to look at more with a policy change
than with a policy generated anew.193 The dissent argued that agencies
must always explain why the change was made and agreed with the
majority that agencies must engage with prior facts and justifications.194
Surprisingly, almost all of the 2017 and 2018 deregulatory actions
and the statutory-abnegation actions discussed here failed to grapple
with the Encino Motorcars decision.195 This 2016 case, decided after
Justice Scalia’s death, included a clearer majority opinion written by
Justice Kennedy. Encino Motorcars lacked the uncertainty in Fox
created by multiple opinions quibbling over ostensible majority
language. The Court rejected as inadequately justified the agency’s
revised policy about employment status in the context of car
dealerships. Agencies making a policy change must, as always, “give
adequate reasons” for their decisions.196 And the Encino Court stated
that, as under the typical “hard look review” articulated in State Farm,
this means that an agency “must examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational
connection between the facts found and the choices made.”197 The
Court again emphasized the need for assessment of any “reliance
interests” and, quoting Fox, stated that a “reasoned explanation is
needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were
engendered by the prior policy.”198 And “unexplained inconsistency”
is a basis for holding a new agency action “arbitrary and capricious.”199
The Encino Court notably did not quote or refine Fox’s language about
the agency change not needing to be “better” or that an agency’s
“belie[f]” that it was better would be enough, leaving its continued
force uncertain.
None of the 2017 and 2018 abnegation actions discuss the
implications of Massachusetts v. EPA,200 which involved arguments

accompanying text.
193. Fox, 556 U.S. at 515.
194. Id. at 551 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195. Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125–26.
196. See id. at 2125–26.
197. Id. at 2125.
198. Id. at 2126 (quoting Fox, 556 U.S. at 515–16).
199. Id. at 2125 (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 981 (2005)).
200. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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based on both abnegation and presidential power in an attempt to
justify the agency’s policy reversal about its own power to address
climate change.201 The Court’s opinion, however, strongly rejected the
attempted abnegation and declined to accept presidential political
priorities as justification for the petition denial and ongoing inaction
on climate change.202 The Massachusetts v. EPA Court ordered EPA to
reassess its action in light of the statute’s procedural and substantive
requirements.203 Neither the abnegation claim nor the presidentialpriorities argument triggered any lessened burden of agency
justification. If anything, the decision is an unusually strong affirmation
of the need for expertise, rational decisionmaking, engagement with
science and facts, and apolitical agencies, at least in the sense of
requiring that statutory choices be the paramount shaper of agency
power and actions.204
The subsequent Michigan v. EPA decision did not involve a policy
change, but it did involve abnegation of an agency’s authority to
consider the costs associated with its regulation of air toxins from
power plants. Much like Massachusetts, Michigan prompted a judicial
skewering of the agency’s “interpretive gerrymanders” and selective
attention to “context” to justify the regulatory choice.205 The Court
likewise compelled the agency to go back and fully attend to the
statutorily required analysis of regulatory effects.
In fact, none of these cases even implicitly indicates that
deregulation based on abnegation alone somehow eliminates other
agency requirements for justifying a policy choice or shift. And no
opinion provides that a policy revision aligned with a presidential edict
201. The Court in Massachusetts v. EPA did not emphasize how changes of statutory
interpretation would interact with consistency doctrine; this may explain the failure of agencies
to cite and grapple with its lessons in the many deregulatory statutory-abnegation actions
discussed here. Massachusetts v. EPA has key language rejecting the adequacy of EPA’s asserted
lack of power and requiring analysis shaped by statutory criteria. See id. at 528–35.
202. Id. at 513–14, 532–35.
203. Id. at 532–35.
204. For analysis of Massachusetts and its emphasis on expertise and deemphasis of politics as
a rationale for regulatory action, see generally David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger:
Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095
(2008); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2007).
205. See Michigan v. EPA, 138 S. Ct. 2699, 2707–11 (2015) (rejecting EPA’s claim that it
lacked the power to consider costs associated with its regulation to reduce risks of mercury
pollution from power plants). The dissent, by Justice Kagan and joined by three other Justices,
agreed with a general default rule that reasonable agency action requires considering costs unless
precluded by the statute. Id. at 2716 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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more easily surmounts these requirements. At most, one sentence in
Fox—suggesting that agencies need not show that a revised policy is
“better”—provides agencies with a cushion; if all of the law and facts
are in rough balance, then an agency will likely succeed in its policy
revision.
But these cases all share the requirement that agencies must
engage with the “facts and circumstances that underlie” an earlier
action. Such “underlying facts and circumstances” will usually be
repeatedly stated and linked to relevant law by agencies in explaining
their action initially and later in defending it in court. Hence, an agency
proposing a policy change will need to engage with these earlier stated
“facts and circumstances” that had been viewed as justifying a different
legal view and course of action.206 Yet none of the recent agency
abnegations meaningfully grappled with the factual findings,
reasoning, or impact of the past or revised policy choice, as required by
Supreme Court doctrine. Encino’s 2016 decision—a modest
embellishment and clarification of the law after State Farm and Fox—
stated that “unexplained inconsistency” is not permissible.207
206. During the usual litigation over a major rule, those justifications will be reiterated and
likely sharpened. See Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1405–07 (discussing why
the process of promulgating and defending regulation will lead to further explication and
elucidation).
207. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (quoting Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (alterations omitted)).
Such policies can be established by informal adjudicatory choices and changed in similar
subsequent actions; change must still be justified by the agency. See, e.g., American Bar Ass’n v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-2476, 2019 WL 858770, at *19–21 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2019) (finding an
unacknowledged and unexplained policy shift on loan forgiveness to be arbitrary and capricious).
Policy change based on pretextual claims or without a record basis also can fall under this body
of law. For example, two trial courts rejected the Department of Commerce’s decision to add
citizenship-status questions to the census questionnaire despite previous Department views to the
contrary and internal expert findings of the Census Bureau about likely effects which would
undercut the claimed rationale. See generally New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp.
3d 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (extensively documenting, based on the agency record, inconsistencies
with the claimed rationale for adding a citizenship question to the census form and faulting the
agency for failure to explain changed conclusions about the effect of adding such a question), cert.
granted before judgment, Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 953 (2019); California v.
Ross, No. 18-cv-01865, 2019 WL 1052434, at *66–69 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019) (finding the addition
of a citizenship question to be based on pretextual grounds and to be an arbitrary and capricious
decision, with agency conclusions lacking evidentiary support). Both trial courts separately
looked at materials outside the record due to infirmities and conflicts in the agency’s claims and
justifications, but the courts broke out extra-record considerations from review of the action and
conclusions based on the agency’s own compiled record. The Solicitor General’s Supreme Court
merits brief faults the Southern District of New York trial court for “extra-record” discovery but
only glancingly address lower-court findings based on the agency’s own administrative record.
Brief for Petitioners at 9–10, 16, 55, Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 953 (Mar. 6,
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Recent abnegation-based deregulatory proposals emphasize the
possibility of politically responsive policy change. However, they
disregard or barely acknowledge the persistent doctrinal emphasis on
agency obligations to address “contingencies” that justified the past
action and to engage in a rigorous comparison of the old and new
policy.208 Most recent shifts accordingly seem fated for eventual judicial
rejection unless they succeed in provoking a major shift in
administrative law.
If agency abnegation is intended as a sound regulatory and
litigation strategy—an assertion I question below—then it almost
seems rooted in a logic error, mistaking the possibility of policy change
for a sufficient rationale, while ignoring the conditions and hurdles that
an agency must surmount to succeed in such a policy change. As a
result, courts have repeatedly faulted Trump-administration agencies
for failing to provide required process before making a policy change;
for failing to engage with and provide comparative analysis of
underlying facts, circumstances, and reasoning previously viewed as
relevant; and for failing to provide the new “good reasons” for the
policy change.209
B. The Doctrinal Disadvantages of Abnegation
Because agencies relying on abnegation to make a policy change
have focused on statutory language while neglecting to engage with
past explanations, underlying facts, changing conditions, and reliance
interests, they appear to be repeatedly running afoul of the
requirements of consistency doctrine. But abnegation is also
strategically puzzling, even if one looks past the mandates of
consistency doctrine. As shown in this Part, abnegation is usually
unnecessary and legally disadvantageous for the agency under the
prevailing, deferential standards of review.
Both before and after the Supreme Court decided Chevron,

2019) (No. 18-966).
208. See Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1376.
209. For analysis of these deregulatory actions and judicial rejections, see id. at 1408–17. For
a recent tally and exploration of reasons for this high percentage of agency litigation losses, see
Barbash & Paul, supra note 43 (documenting and discussing high percentage of losses); see also
Lisa Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Problems (So Far) of Trump’s Deregulatory
Binge, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 16–47 (2018) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Unreasonable
Delays] (analyzing the first wave of Trump-administration stay-and-delay actions and judicial
rejections); infra Part III.D (reviewing opinions rejecting the adequacy of statutory-abnegation
rationales for policy reversals).
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agencies have routinely justified their actions by weaving together
interpretations of enabling legislation with choices rooted in their
regulatory expertise.210 Because statutes rarely mandate just one course
of action, and empirical study usually reveals social problems as having
numerous causes and presenting tradeoffs for any regulatory response,
agencies typically have latitude to make context-rich judgments that
draw on the agency’s experience and expertise.211 The Skidmore212
decision created what is now the default deference regime, used when
an agency has acted outside of a notice-and-comment setting.213 It also
emphasizes deference as grounded in an agency’s expertise and the
thoroughness of its reasoning, among a number of factors now often
characterized as “Mead-Skidmore”214 sliding-scale deference.215
In contrast, abnegation, with its near-exclusive focus on statutory
language to claim obligatory policy change, is a recipe for reduced or
no deference under this regime. In adopting such a narrow focus,
recent agency attempts at policy change via abnegation have seldom
relied on expert analysis of statutory factors and on-the-ground effects
of regulatory policy. If the agency is claiming mere obedience to an allknowing and constraining Congress, then the traditional expertisebased justifications for any deference fall away.

210. See Herz, supra note 162, at 1897 (describing deference to agencies as long rooted in
delegated authority and expertise, well before Chevron, and discussing NLRB v. Hearst Pubs.,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 114–15, 130–31 (1944)).
211. Agencies’ interpretive roles are intertwined with their congressionally delegated
policymaking roles, both of which draw on their expertise. See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to
Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2015) (discussing agencies’ delegated roles and development of
“craft” expertise); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND.
L. REV. 937, 956–65 (2018) (discussing delegated roles and conceptions of “interpretation” and
“policymaking” in the Chevron case and as allocated by regulatory statutes). See generally Wendy
E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Power,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019 (2015) (explaining congressionally delegated agency roles and
expertise, benefits of deliberative procedures, and tensions between presidential control through
OIRA and agencies’ delegated roles).
212. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
213. See id. at 140 (stating factors now called sliding-scale review, including “consistency” as
a favorable factor); see also Peter L. Strauss, Deference Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them
“Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1153–72 (2012) [hereinafter
Strauss, Deference Is Too Confusing] (discussing the applicability and conceptual differences of
judicial review under Chevron and Skidmore).
214. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
215. Strauss, Deference Is Too Confusing, supra note 213, at 1154. Mead made clear that
Skidmore provides the scope-of-review framework when the underlying law or the agency’s
procedural choices render Chevron deference inapplicable. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234–35.
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Statutory abnegation is also a disadvantageous strategy when
assessed under Chevron’s famed Two-Step framework. As introduced
earlier (and much applied in the courts and analyzed in scholarship),
judicial scrutiny under Chevron toggles between zero deference at Step
One, if Congress has addressed the “precise question at issue,” and
substantial deference at Step Two, if the statute is silent, leaves a gap,
or is ambiguous regarding how the agency should regulate.216 In the
zero-deference Step One setting, the agency and court must agree on
that single answer.217 At Step Two, however, the Court in Chevron
recognized that agencies frequently have to make policy choices that
balance conflicting statutory policies, require the exercise of discretion
delegated to the agency by Congress, and depend on political and
pragmatic calculations about how best to regulate.218 And where the
action involves technical and scientific expertise, as risk-regulating
agencies’ actions often do, the Court indicated that judicial deference
to an agency is especially appropriate.219 Although Chevron deference
is less favorable to agencies than once thought, agencies still benefit
from the deference afforded by Step Two in defending regulatory
choices.220
The subsequent Mead case both built on Chevron and also
clarified when and why Chevron deference applies.221 It, too, creates an
unfavorable standard for agencies seeking to roll back regulations
through abnegation. When agencies make a reasoned choice from
among a range of possible options, that choice occurs in a setting
characterized by two types of political accountability. Although some
courts and scholars have read Chevron as reflecting just one type of
political accountability—the president’s electoral accountability—the
opinion actually is built on several rationales. The Court emphasized
legislative supremacy–based accountability in the form of Congress
choosing to delegate to the agency (not the courts) and Congress
setting the criteria for action to be weighed by that expert delegate.222

216. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984).
217. Id. at 842.
218. Id. at 843–45; Siegel, supra note 211, at 962–65.
219. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45, 861–66.
220. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1150 (2008) (finding consistency remains an important factor for judicial deference and agency
victory, even in cases where Chevron is applied).
221. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001).
222. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45, 861–66.
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It also, in more frequently cited language, emphasized electoral and
hierarchical accountability, contrasting agency leadership’s fealty to
the elected president as well as Congress delegating turf to an agency
with the alternative of reposing primary interpretive power in judges
lacking expertise or political accountability.223 Chevron involved
notice-and-comment rulemaking with its usual quasi-legislative forms
of participation and transparency in reasoning, but the decision itself
left unclear if that procedural mode was also an underpinning of the
case’s call for judicial deference.224 That question was resolved in Mead,
where the Court emphasized that the procedural accountability
associated with quasi-legislative rulemaking also justifies deference.
This procedural context entails transparent, participatory, and
deliberative notice-and-comment proceedings where Congress
intended agencies to act with the “force of law.”225
So when agencies argue, as they usually can, that they are acting
in a Chevron Step Two setting, they benefit from substantial judicial
deference of several types. Agencies, not courts, have been delegated
the expert task by Congress. They hence can claim legislative
supremacy–based legitimacy. Agencies also can claim special expertise
about the implications of their choices. They know best—or at least
know more than courts—how competing tasks or policies should best
be reconciled, due to their familiarity with statutory and regulatory law
and ongoing work with all affected stakeholders. They know the law,
plus they are deeply familiar with on-the-ground effects of policy
choices.226 This is a quintessential attribute of expertise-based
accountability. They are also subject to the president’s electoral
accountability, and they generally must use a transparent, participatory
process to act with the force of law. This is a process-based form of

223. Id. at 865–66 (discussing agency authority and, “within the limits of that delegation,
properly rely[ing] upon the incumbent administration’s view of wise policy”).
224. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law,
92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1171–72 (2014) (discussing usual procedural prerequisites for agency claims
of deference after Mead); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 883, 852–63 (2001) (discussing triggers for Chevron deference and emphasizing procedural
accountability provided through notice-and-comment rulemaking like that generating the policy
upheld in Chevron).
225. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. The Court in Mead also discussed formal adjudications as a setting
justifying Chevron deference. See id. at 227–31 (2001). See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency
Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004) (discussing agency options of
policymaking modes post-Mead, and their repercussions).
226. See generally Shapiro, supra note 211 (discussing forms of expertise wielded and
developed by agencies).
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accountability; courts look for agency fealty to such participatory
process and full and adequate explanation.227
Due to these differences in expertise and linked forms of
accountability, courts reviewing an action in a Chevron Step Two
setting will look for a reasonable agency choice, not necessarily the
choice that the court would have made; the agency’s legal
interpretation need only be “permissible” or “reasonable.” This all
means that an agency setting itself up for review under the favorable
Chevron Step Two posture—which requires a successful claim that
statutory language leaves room for agency discretion—can point to
several forms of political accountability justifying judicial deference to
agency views. If agencies succeed in this claim, and underlying facts,
science, or data provide an adequate basis, agencies are advantaged by
how Chevron and Mead provide agencies with room for a range of
permissible policy choices.
Furthermore, agencies acting in a Chevron Step Two setting also
protect their power in a second way. They preserve the ability to adjust
their statutory interpretation and resulting policy in the future.228 Step
Two interpretive choices, by definition and as explained above, are
permissible choices in a setting that usually provides multiple such
options (provided other choices can be justified in light of relevant facts
and likely regulatory effects). Agencies always need to react to a
changing world and often will develop better means to achieve a
statutory end. Chevron itself involved just such a policy shift. EPA
changed its approach to factory pollution in response to growing
regulatory sophistication about, and interest in, use of market-based
regulatory strategies. An undefined statutory term gave EPA latitude
to do so.229 Thus, Chevron Step Two is often available to an agency and
is a favorable posture for eventual judicial review. It preserves agency
flexibility to later adjust its action without necessarily triggering
arguments that the agency had shifted policy or changed its statutory
interpretation.230 In other words, an agency that consistently identifies

227. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 224, at 1171–72 (discussing usual procedural
prerequisites for agency claims of deference after Mead).
228. Chevron itself emphasized EPA as an agency learning from experience and consistently
and permissibly interpreting governing language “flexibly” in order to “engage in informed
rulemaking.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64.
229. Id.
230. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 549–
53 (1985) (discussing how Chevron and State Farm can be reconciled, and noting that the Court
in Chevron did not analyze the agency’s action under the framework for review of agency policy
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a range of permissible options to address a social challenge is, when
later embracing one of those choices, making a modest policy shift that
may not involve any changed view of its statutory powers.
Chevron does, however, come with a downside that agencies may
be seeking to avoid through abnegation claims, even though that means
foregoing the benefits of Chevron Step Two deference. Because
Chevron Step Two involves an agency choice and requires justification,
it shares a key attribute with consistency-doctrine cases. Chevron
necessarily requires the agency to explain based on policy grounds why
its choice is well founded, or at least not arbitrary and capricious, when
examined in light of statutory factors and full engagement with
underlying data or science.231 Prominent scholars soundly argue that
Step Two reasonableness analysis is in fact a variant of, or at least
overlaps with, the “arbitrary and capricious” analysis governed by the
Overton Park232 and State Farm cases.233 This other linked body of law
emphatically requires agencies to engage with evidence and criticism,
and to offer “reasoned decisionmaking” to justify its decisions.234
Such full engagement under “arbitrary and capricious” and “hard
look review” involves several burdens that agencies changing policy
may yearn to avoid. First, agencies will need to engage with all arguably
salient science or data. They will need to respond to substantive
comments and criticisms offered by those participating in the process
and provide rationales for choices or changes that also engage relevant
science and past agency views and conclusions.235 The track record of
the earlier policy, changes in societal conditions, and shifts in reliance
on the regulation must be assessed. Such work is labor intensive and
will slow down any change. Second, the science or facts may, when
change and “hard look review” set forth in State Farm).
231. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 853–65 (tracing EPA’s policy shifts, underlying support for the new
“bubble strategy,” and permissible nature of such expertise-based changes through “informed
rulemaking”). Mead further emphasized the importance of deliberative procedures for generating
actions worthy of Chevron Step Two deference. See supra notes 221–27 and accompanying text
(discussing questions resolved through Mead).
232. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1972).
233. Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253, 1268–69 (1997) (stating that despite Chevron’s use of the term “interpretation,” the
actual opinion involved an assessment of how factual and economic rationales supported the
agency’s reasoning).
234. Id.
235. See Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 555, 565–66 (2011) (discussing different agency and judicial tasks when governing
legislation requires the agency to provide “factually grounded explanation” as opposed to one
grounded in “value judgment[s]”).
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reviewed in court, present a genuine barrier to a regulatory reversal
that must be shown to be a reasonable choice in light of such empirical
materials. Similarly, problematic facts may be politically disastrous.236
For example, if a regulatory reversal will lead to a wave of illness or
deaths, or an increase in pollution under a provision requiring
“emissions reductions,” the agency understandably (but not legally)
may hope to avoid a firestorm of criticism by ignoring such facts and
by dodging the requirement to highlight inconsistency with protective
statutory criteria.237
Furthermore, changes will arise between the initial regulatory
action and the later move to deregulate. Agencies must assess the track
record of compliance and other regulatory effects and changes while
also considering the effects of the proposed change. As discussed
above, the Court’s mandate that agencies assess reliance interests when
making a policy change is directed at this sort of on-the-ground
change.238 Old agency predictions about the regulation sought to be
changed will often prove inaccurate. Regulated entities or companies
eager to meet a new market demand quickly figure out means to
comply with a regulatory mandate, often at a far more reasonable cost
than initially predicted.239 And societal conditions also change,
requiring agencies to update their assumptions. In fact, any legal choice
will lead citizens and economic players to capitalize on new
opportunities or minimize compliance costs. Such adjustments and

236. Cf. J.B. Ruhl & Kyle Robisch, Agencies Running from Agency Discretion, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 97, 102–03, 109–10 (2016) (exploring agencies avoiding work and potential
political costs by claiming they have no discretion due to doctrine developed at the intersection
of two laws governing risks to endangered species).
237. The CPP’s replacement is predicted to increase pollution and cause a substantial increase
in deaths. This revelation spurred substantial adverse press and comment. See Lisa Friedman,
Costs of New Coal Rules: Up to 1,400 More Deaths a Year, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/climate/epa-coal-pollution-deaths.html [https://perma.cc/
EBJ6-YWE7] (reviewing the proposed rule and additional expected deaths, statements of
President Trump about helping coal country, and other coal-linked rollbacks); see also supra notes
107–14 and accompanying text (discussing agency efforts to avoid disclosure of how the tipregulation change would shift wealth away from servers and to management).
238. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing such requirements in cases setting forth key elements
of consistency doctrine).
239. When EPA denied petitions to reconsider the CPP, it found that clean-energy shifts from
coal to gas were happening at lower cost and more rapidly than originally anticipated. See supra
notes 64–66 and accompanying text. See generally Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation
Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395 (2009)
(describing and analyzing overallocation of pollution rights under cap-and-trade regimes and
reasons compliance tends to be easier than predicted).
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market benefits of past regulation can give rise to new, formidable
analytical burdens as well as legal and political barriers to change.240
So, at Chevron Step Two, agencies are advantaged by deferential
judicial review and benefit from retained policy flexibility, but this does
not mean the work will be easy or fast. Agencies still need to engage
and make arguments in favor of the deregulatory move or other policy
shift where science, potential harms, and logic might present serious
justificatory challenges. In addition, a choice that is acknowledged to
be a discretionary policy change, not a legally mandated change, may
create a political tempest. Blame for an unpopular change will fall on
the agency or the president, not on Congress for some earlier allegedly
imprudent statute or on a court for an allegedly unsound decision.
Despite recurrent claims that agencies are eager to grab power and
turf, scholars of regulation often observe tendencies to avoid risk,
dodge work, and shun publicity.241 Hence, deregulation through
statutory abnegation confounds the turf-expansion expectation in two
ways. Agencies are denying themselves turf, plus they appear to be
avoiding work.
Thus, to distill this section’s discussion, viewed from the
perspective of doctrinal frames and legal prospects, statutory
abnegation necessarily puts the agency into a disadvantageous posture,
creating several pathways to defeat in the courts. The infirmities of not
addressing other consistency-doctrine hurdles is, for now, put to the
side. First, if an agency claims only one possible interpretive choice, a
240. See Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, supra note 58, at 1088–92 (discussing how regulatory
regimes can lead to investment and entrench such regulation).
241. See Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1711–15 (2008) (discussing the problem of
regulations stuck in rulemaking “ruts”); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory
Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2003) [hereinafter Buzbee,
Recognizing the Regulatory Commons] (identifying as “regulatory commons” settings where
shared or uncertain regulatory turfs create incentives for potential regulators to leave social ills
unaddressed); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 297–98 (1998) (identifying problems of rigidified law
and regulation, and advocating “experimentalist” strategies conducive to new information and
legal improvement); Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 304 (1999) (discussing many
reasons for agency “slippage”); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional
Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 923–37 (2005) (questioning the agency empire-building hypothesis);
see also MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS: POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 151–72 (2000) (observing, after discussing
bureaucrats’ actions within multiple agencies during the deregulatory Reagan administration, that
depending on context, political and career regulators at times will seek to reduce agency power
or avoid work and risk, not expand agency authority).
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court has to agree with that choice for the agency to win on that
interpretive issue.242 Any different reading by the court means the
agency loses. Second, even if a court agrees that the agency choice is
legally permissible, the agency loses if a court concludes that the
agency erred in viewing itself as constrained to that single permissible
interpretation.243 Even without affording deference to the agency, the
court might see the enabling act as providing an array of regulatory
choices. If so, the agency loses and will eventually have to try again. If
the agency had a range of choices, it needs to explain why it chose one
versus another, attending to relevant facts and statutory criteria
guiding such choices.244 Third—in a variant on the second
permutation—if the reviewing court identifies some statutory silence,
gap, or ambiguity that, under Chevron, translates into the agency
having some factually and contextually informed range of
policymaking choices, then the erroneous claimed lack of discretion
could also lead to judicial rejection.245 Thus, the self-constraining
agency that relies on a statutory-abnegation claim heightens risks of
judicial reversal and also limits its future flexibility.
III. RATIONALIZING THE STATUTORY-ABNEGATION STRATEGY,
AND NORMATIVE CONCERNS
Agency policy shifts relying on statutory abnegation are thus, if
measured by likely long-term legal success, a puzzler. Agencies are
both disadvantaging themselves and embracing a lessened view of their

242. See NextEra Desert Ctr. Blythe, LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 852 F.3d 1118,
1122–23 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding the agency erred regarding its own authority and hence remand
was required); Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (rejecting agency action due to
agency error about its own statutory authority); Hemel & Nielson, supra note 23, at 818–21
(analyzing cases holding that agency errors about the nature of their own authority must be
rejected).
243. Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35, 41–43, 45, 50 n.18 (D.D.C. 2003)
(noting agency error about the nature of its own legal authority requires judicial rejection, and
parsing views of the Solicitor for the Bureau of Land Management and the Department of the
Interior to determine if error regarding authority tainted a resulting regulation).
244. For example, language might leave room for a few choices, but the effects of those
choices might make clear that some choices, in actual application and in light of underlying facts
about effects or business dynamics, would violate a statute’s protective goals. This is part of the
logic of judicial review under Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). An
agency can be acting within a correct understanding of its governing statutory criteria, but it will
still need to show its actual choice is not “arbitrary [and] capricious” under the APA, and this
involves “inquiry into the facts” that should be “searching and careful” to ensure the agency did
not make a “clear error of judgment.” Id. at 416.
245. Hemel & Nielson, supra note 23, at 802–03.
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own powers. But if one takes seriously the reality that regulation
involves human institutions guided by law but operating in a political
matrix, then agency statutory abnegation becomes both more
understandable and problematic. As long posited by positive political
theory, all regulatory actors will behave strategically in light of
incentives they face and in light of one another’s actions; the political
calculus may not mesh with an obedient focus on what the law seems
to require.246 This Part operates at two levels. First, it illuminates why
agencies and their leaders might opt for statutory abnegation when
other approaches would promise more long-term legal success.
But this Part’s second major section argues that the very political
incentives driving abnegation reveal the shaky foundations of
arguments that politicized regulation should be embraced or even
trigger some lesser level of judicial scrutiny. And agencies utilizing
abnegation rationales should not be given a pass from obligations to
act in conformity with the usual legal and analytical hurdles, whether
the action is new or a policy change. Much of administrative law is
designed to nudge or compel agencies to exercise their delegated
expertise in conformity with legislative instructions and in quasidemocratic, transparent, and accountable fashion. As attempted,
agency disavowals of authority have been accompanied by skirting of
procedural and substantive hurdles that have long been required in
order to foster sound and accountable regulatory actions. Presidential
mandates and agency obedience constitute one form of political
accountability, but in the abnegation setting all other norms and
practices of political accountability have been neglected. As argued
below, well-established doctrine appropriately rewards actions
reflecting respect for multiple sources of political accountability. As
courts have found, presidential edicts are inadequate justifications for
inexpert agency rollbacks that dodge full engagement with
congressional requirements, do not analyze underlying science and
data, and fail to grapple with past reasoning and regulatory
contestation.
A. Abnegation as a Surrender or Expansion of Agency Power
A longstanding antiregulatory argument is that agencies must be
subject to checks or they will predictably seek to expand their turf and
aggrandize their authority, burdening society with growing bodies of
246. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (introducing Positive Political Theory and
citing literature).
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regulation.247 This claim persists but has, at this point, been subject to
cogent theoretical and empirical historical critiques.248 There is little
reason to anticipate that agencies will predictably skew towards
overreach or self-aggrandizement. Agency abnegation, however, also
illuminates a fundamental lack of nuance at the heart of the agency
“empire building” hypothesis. As shown by the wave of agency
attempts at abnegation, agencies can simultaneously deny themselves
power to address a risk and, at the same time, claim newly expansive
powers to redefine their authority. This section briefly explains this
seeming paradox of power denial and power claiming.
Agencies are, as indicated by their very label, agents of Congress
and the president. They are handed tasks and turf defined by statutes.
They wield that power subject to additional delegation of authority
from the president, personnel appointments, and political oversight
and direction from the president and sometimes Congress. But
congressionally delegated tasks and presidential priorities can and
often do clash. In fact, statutes empowering and obligating agencies
often reflect past bargains and priorities that may not mesh with any
branch’s later policy preferences.249 Nonetheless, the choices and
compromises embodied in statutes live on due to the usual hurdles to
enacting any legislation.250
Any deviation from Congress’s statutory delegation—whether
that deviation cuts in a regulatory or deregulatory direction—
ultimately involves an agency seeking to define the extent of its own
power. One sort of deviation could be in the form claimed by William

247. See Levinson, supra note 241, at 923–37 (presenting and questioning the “empirebuilding” hypothesis).
248. See, e.g., id.; see also GOLDEN, supra note 241, at 151–72 (questioning the “rational actor”
theory’s expectations of self-interested agency officials’ behavior resulting in shirking and budget
maximization, and instead observing an array of responses to agency power, with agency cultures,
personalities, and career and political appointees’ different incentives leading to varied actions);
Blais & Wagner, supra note 241, at 1711–15 (discussing the problem of long-unamended
regulations); Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 241, at 5–6 (identifying
“regulatory commons” dynamics and how regulatory overlap and uncertain turf can create
incentives for potential regulators to leave social ills unaddressed); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 241,
at 297–98 (identifying problems of regulatory stasis and advocating regulatory design that would
generate new information and trigger regulatory adjustments); Farber, supra note 241, at 304
(discussing forms of agency “slippage” and reasons for agency delay and inaction).
249. See Patricia M. Wald, The “New Administrative Law”—With the Same Old Judges in It?,
1991 DUKE L.J. 647, 651 (discussing agencies seeking to carry out policies of the “current
administration” that “chafe at the bridle of old statutes” and resulting tensions with reviewing
courts).
250. Id. (noting hurdles to statutory change in an era of “divided government”).
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A. Niskanen and others generally critical of the administrative state.
They focus on an agency claiming new or expanded turf, or regulating
risks in a way more stringent or onerous than Congress allegedly
intended in its statutory delegation.251
But agencies abnegating previously claimed authority reveal
another sort of power claim. An agency that deviates from
congressional expectations through a regulatory withdrawal—whether
by redefining its statutory powers or by relaxing implementation and
enforcement (a common occurrence that is hard to challenge)—is also
making a claim about the extent of its authority.252
The wave of abnegation claims presented here, at a minimum,
provides yet another substantial factual counterpoint to the oft-stated
argument that agencies will overreach in the form of turf expansion
and excess stringency. It also provides a counterpoint to the view that
doctrine and regulatory infrastructure should be designed to check an
allegedly pervasive agency tendency to overregulate.253 Political and
economic incentives can lead agencies to act in a turf-shrinking
direction while also asserting questionable statutory interpretations
and violating administrative-law tenets about agency consistency. As
such, any one-sided doctrinal “cures” or checks may actually
exacerbate already prevalent problems of agency disregard for
statutorily defined domains, as well as risks of agency lassitude and
“torpor.”254 In addition, regulated parties and powerful interest groups
will predictably seek to reduce regulatory burdens at every stage, from
enabling legislation down to tailored planning, permits, requests for
variances, or enforcement negotiations.255 If “slippage” and laxity are
251. See generally WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1971) (positing the tendency of regulators to expand budgets through more
regulation); ANDRE BLAIS & STEPHANE DION, THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT 4, 5
(1991) (same). For other responses to these claims, see supra note 241 and accompanying text.
252. Cf. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297–98 (2013) (rejecting calls for a distinction
between ordinary review of agency action and review of “jurisdictional” claims due to the
difficulty of drawing such a line, since all agency actions reflect a view of the agency’s power).
253. Much of the role of OIRA and the imposition of cost-benefit analysis, as well as
regulatory-reform proposals and deregulatory orders, are rooted in such a claim of agency excess.
See, e.g., supra Part II.A.1 (reviewing Trump deregulatory orders and memoranda, and claims
about regulatory excess).
254. Metzger, 1930s Redux, supra note 30, at 86 (quoting Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2339–40 (2001) (discussing such risks)).
255. For review of such multilayered strategic efforts to weaken or escape regulatory
strictures in the setting of a massive land-use highway project threatening a vulnerable fishery,
see WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, FIGHTING WESTWAY: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, CITIZEN ACTIVISM,
AND THE REGULATORY WAR THAT TRANSFORMED NEW YORK CITY 31–51 (2014). The book
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a risk, as they are, regulatory-process choices and standards of review
need to adjust for those risks as well.256
B. Political-Economic Theory and Abnegation
This Part now turns to analyzing the central mystery of statutory
abnegation. Why would—really, why have—agencies found the
statutory-abnegation strategy worth pursuing, despite its doctrinal
disadvantages and the diminution in agency turf and policy discretion
that it entails? As analyzed in the sections that follow, political and
economic incentives make sense of abnegation, further illuminating its
troubling legal implications. Legal actors, especially agencies and
presidents, are not invariably disinterested agents faithfully hewing to
legislative instructions; rather, they are entities responding to their own
incentives in a dynamic, political, and interactive environment.257 Many
incentives shaping agency actions are unrelated to what the law says or
requires, but legal hurdles remain.258 This section’s analysis also reveals
the inadequacies of political-accountability rationales often wielded in
battles over the value of, and perils of, the administrative state. Of
course, abnegation could include sound claims about the limits of
agency authority; it is not necessarily or by definition illegal. However,
agencies relying on abnegation claims have almost always also dodged
procedural requirements that guarantee accountability and
opportunities for public input, made little use of agency expertise, and
provided little or no engagement with facts and the earlier action’s
regulatory track record. They have offered little explanation other than
summary linguistic analysis and virtually no close legal comparison of
old and new views of agency authority.259
When abnegating agencies focus only on statutory clarity or
presidential edicts under a new administration, they are relying on two
traces and analyzes the fourteen-year battle, the “art of regulatory war,” and how partisans fight
strategically in multiple venues over time to achieve their goals and identify and seek to exploit
regulatory vulnerabilities.
256. See Farber, supra note 241 (discussing agency “slippage” from delegated tasks).
257. Again, this view of agencies as acting in a sequential, interactive, political, and legally
constrained environment with shifting and strategic incentives is a major difference between
simple, more deterministic rational-actor theories of agency behavior, see, e.g., NISKANEN, supra
note 251, and PPT assumptions. See also supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (citing works
describing key elements of PPT); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article
I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 528–33 (1992) (analyzing legislative processes and how
changes in the status quo and branch powers interrelate in dynamic ways).
258. See Wald, supra note 249, at 651.
259. See supra Part I.A (reviewing a sample of abnegation claims).
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facets of regulatory political accountability. Such hierarchical
obedience to the president and political appointees does not, however,
logically or doctrinally excuse neglect of all of the other critically
important sources of agency legitimacy, accountability, responsiveness,
and clarity. These other neglected sources of political accountability
remain crucial to the regulatory rule of law and, relatedly, reflect a
“moral” commitment explaining many of the longstanding norms
governing the administrative state.260 This section now analyzes why
agencies and presidents may find abnegation rationales for regulatory
rollbacks worthwhile, despite doctrinal disadvantages, legal infirmities,
and normative concerns.
1. A Long-Shot but Worthwhile Risk. If one thinks of agency
decisionmaking as not just about a particular regulatory intervention
but as reflecting concern with, and also influencing, the agency’s future
authority, abnegation may reflect an antiregulatory administration’s
long-shot gamble for a long-term diminution in agency power and,
concomitantly, an enduring deregulatory result.
The agency actions discussed above involve, in a variety of forms
and to different degrees, agencies’ assertions that they simply cannot
regulate as before. Because a claim of no power is hard to justify under
most statutes, and consistency doctrine requires agency policy shifts to
be justified with much more engagement and explanation than actually
undertaken by abnegating agencies, most 2017 and 2018 attempts at
abnegation are legally vulnerable. But deregulation rooted in
abnegation, whether ultimately rejected or successful, can provide both
political and judicial benefits. Even an ultimate court defeat for
abnegating agencies can offer political benefits, which are reviewed
below. But the long-shot chance that courts will bless a power-limiting
statutory interpretation is worth analyzing here.
If an agency proffers a “no power” claim, it is making a potentially
enduring assertion about its own authority and how the underlying
statute must be construed in the future. If a court agrees, especially
under a single-venue judicial-review statute or if later embraced by the

260. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative Law, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1946–55 (2018) (discussing “rule of law” values, consistency doctrine, and
reliance interests as forms of “morality” enforced by administrative law, even though some lack
a grounding in any particular positive law). The essay builds off of fundamental legal virtues and
needs identified earlier by Lon Fuller outside of the administrative state. Id. at 1925–26 (setting
forth attributes of “law’s internal morality” identified in LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 38–44 (rev. ed. 1969)).

BUZBEE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1568

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/25/2019 4:08 PM

[Vol. 68:1509

Supreme Court, then that abnegating statutory interpretation becomes
permanent.261 The statute, and the agency’s power under it, would be
permanently modified in a diminished form. And during an era of
legislative gridlock, a congressional fix is especially unlikely. Even if
the abnegation claim is of the more contingent “we can’t regulate in
that way” sort, judicial agreement that an agency cannot use a
particular regulatory tool or strategy would make some diminished
authority permanent. Presidential or agency leadership seeking to
weaken the regulatory scheme in the long term simply may view such
claims as worth a shot, especially if one considers political benefits that
may flow from such possibly successful rollbacks and the minimal
personal costs associated with a judicial rejection.262
2. Changing Policy-Change Doctrine. The recent wave of agency
statutory abnegation could also be a strategic prelude to arguments for
doctrinal change regarding consistency doctrine and hard-look review
in the deregulatory setting. No case now embraces a lesser standard of
review for a deregulatory shift; in fact, the Supreme Court’s enduring,
repeated demand is that agencies—whether engaged in initial
regulation, deregulation, or a policy shift—must confront underlying
facts, assess reliance interests, provide comparative legal reasoning of
the old and new approaches, allow for and respond to critical
comments, and leave no unexplained inconsistency.263 The Court has
long demanded more explanation by agencies when changing policies
than when an agency takes an initial action or simply declines to act.264
As explained above, this body of law does not set a different or higher
261. If an agency’s actions are reviewable in numerous circuits, then the law will need to
progress circuit by circuit, with potential intracircuit respect for precedent and intercircuit
disagreement until Congress intervenes, the agency changes policy, or the Supreme Court
resolves the statutory issue. For discussion of this law and possible linkages of abnegation-based
deregulation in the Trump administration and 1980s litigation on agency nonacquiescence, see
infra note 267 and accompanying text.
262. John Graham, OIRA Administrator during the George W. Bush administration,
identifies the modest personal costs associated with the usual judicial remand to agencies for
failed actions, and possible political gains regardless of long-term success, as sometimes
motivating agency policy choices. Email from John Graham, former OIRA Administrator, to
author (Jan. 31, 2019, 15:15 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); email from John Graham,
former OIRA Administrator, to author (Mar. 7, 2019, 11:07 EST) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
263. See supra notes 168–99 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court opinions
rejecting impliedly lower standards for agency policy shifts and embracing rigorous, fact-driven
analyses).
264. See supra notes 141–46, 170–75 (analyzing the Court’s commitment to “hard look”
review).
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standard of review but rather incorporates elements of hard-look
review, requiring agencies to engage with all salient facts, address
contested issues, and offer “good reasons” for a policy, be it new or a
change. When an agency seeks to alter a preexisting policy, there is
simply more that must be analyzed.265
Agencies pursuing abnegation may hope to convince courts to
create a new doctrinal carveout. Under this view, the argument is, or
would be, that if the agency never had authority in the first instance,
then the agency should be able to avoid the time and costs of
undertaking legally unauthorized factual engagement and
explanation.266 If the earlier claim of power was all overreach and
illegal, then such analysis (under this view) has always been legally
irrelevant. If the Supreme Court sees fit to devise a new, generally
applicable framework that involves less rigorous agency obligations
and less searching judicial review of deregulation by statutory
abnegation, then the structural similarity of these many recent
abnegation claims may make some sense. The numerosity of these
claims perhaps reflects a goal of creating many opportunities to recast
doctrine, whether through lower-court rulings or an increased
probability of a case going to the Supreme Court. In proverbial terms,
the administration and its deregulatory allies may be seeking many
bites of the apple to test the abnegation rationale for deregulation.267
As mentioned above, no case permits agencies to evade the
discussion of facts and of harms resulting from deregulation. But most
265. See text accompanying supra note 259; see also supra note 153 (exploring the power of
agency policy-shift justification obligations).
266. Cf. Ruhl and Robisch, supra note 236, at 102–03, 109–10 (identifying and criticizing
agencies that claim a lack of discretion in order to avoid hard and political costly work, and
characterizing such avoidance as “discretion aversion”).
267. This rash of unreasoned regulatory shifts and their common abnegation rationale could
share attributes with the Reagan administration’s pursuit of both changing Social Security policy
and testing the executive branch’s latitude to nonacquiesce in court rulings, even when acting in
a circuit with established contrary precedent. See William W. Buzbee, Administrative Agency
Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 582, 582–84 (1985) (identifying this practice and
reasons it was problematic but acknowledging the difference between intra- and intercircuit
nonacquiescence); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 735–51 (1989) (analyzing the practice and identifying
settings where it could be justified or should be condemned). For a rejoinder to Estreicher and
Revesz, see Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown
of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 802–03 (1990)
(critiquing Estreicher and Revesz’s assumptions and proposed approach to nonacquiescence).
The Trump administration may similarly be willing to test its theories and lose, hoping for some
wins on the underlying statutory issues or a larger win that reshapes how courts review
deregulatory policy shifts.
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instances of abnegation have involved courts that disagreed with the
agency’s statutory claim of no power, so we do not know if judicial
acceptance of a particular abnegation claim might also lead such a
court to accept or endorse a fast-tracked agency action that neglects
comparative legal and factual analysis. Although some courts might be
sympathetic to agencies short-circuiting their usual consistencydoctrine analytical obligations when a persuasive abnegation claim is
made, close analysis of abnegation-based actions and the logic of
deference regimes cuts against the legality of any such shortcircuiting.268 Nonetheless, because doctrinal adjustments smoothing
the path for deregulation by statutory abnegation would be of enduring
value for all deregulatory and antiregulatory agencies and advocates,
fighting for such a doctrinal change might be viewed as worth the price
of many losses.
3. Political and Career Regulator Tensions. Another explanation
for statutory abnegation and related procedural deficiencies is the
tension or distrust between political appointees and career officials.
Due to their years of service for politically diverse leaders, career
officials will usually know how to identify the weaknesses of an agency
action and reduce the risk of judicial reversal. Internal distrust,
however, can lead political appointees working as change agents to
shirk the usual forms of sequential vetting by career experts in pursuing
legal change.269 News stories and some internal agency investigations

268. See infra Part III.E (exploring why even a broad agency claim of having “no power
whatsoever” should still be accompanied by the comparative analysis called for by consistency
doctrine).
269. News stories indicate that early Trump-administration deregulatory actions were
championed by temporary “beachhead teams” that often were drawn from law firms and
industrial associations. See, e.g., Annie Waldman, Former Lobbyist With For-Profit Colleges Quits
Education Department, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 21, 2017, 10:44 AM), https://www.propublica.org/
article/former-lobbyist-with-for-profit-colleges-quits-education-department
[https://perma.cc/
CFE7-H2QV]. Such actions were reportedly not vetted by career agency professionals (whether
civil servant or Senior Executive Service personnel), perhaps explaining some of their
overreaching and legal infirmities. See infra note 270 (reviewing such a clash). Similar strategies
and resulting flaws plagued the Reagan administration during its deregulatory efforts. See
GOLDEN, supra note 241, at 45–47 (describing how major change was “‘sent down’” by political
appointees pushing deregulation rather than “percolating up” through the agency, as “was
customary for agency policy”). She also found other tensions between political and career
officials; although there was a wide array of responses, few career officials sought to sabotage the
politically led deregulation. Id. at 44–60. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE FIFTH RISK (2018)
(exploring protective roles and innovations prompted by federal agencies, repeatedly recounting
Trump-administration “beachhead teams” and inexperienced political appointees arriving at
agencies without understanding the agencies’ tasks, divisions, or roles played by knowledgeable
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have revealed that agencies in the Trump administration pursued hasty
policy changes due to the advocacy of “beachhead teams” drawn from
affected industries and lobbying organizations, sometimes without the
involvement of career officials.270 News stories also recount similar
tensions between political appointees and career employees within the
Department of Justice, the litigator for federal agencies.271 Similar
interactions were found in a study of Reagan-era deregulatory
efforts.272
Relatedly, regulatory incentives will vary for political and career
officials, potentially leading to reasoning gaps and other lapses by
agencies. Politically accountable agency leadership will unsurprisingly
focus upon electoral pressures and presidential preferences, with
shorter-term advantages or obedience to the president looming large.
Legislators will have an institutional interest in statutes’ ongoing
effectiveness, but in reality may be long gone from the political scene

career officials, and resulting risks and mistakes); see also Barbash & Paul, supra note 43 (quoting
former EPA regulator and Republican lawyer Jeffrey Holmstead about the lack of Trump
leadership “experience” and “the Trump team’s ‘complete distrust of the career staff’ at EPA, . . .
a professional corps that ‘always gives you good advice, whether or not they agree’ with the
president’s politics”).
270. See, e.g., Office of the Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services,
Review of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Cancellation of Marketplace
Enrollment Outreach Efforts (OEI-12-17-00290) (2017) (linked to Press Release, Senator Patty
Murray, Government Watch Dog Investigation, Requested by Senator Murray, Confirms Trump
Administration Sabotaged Open Enrollment Without Any Analysis of Impacts on Patients &
Families (Oct. 25, 2017)) (noting that the “beachhead team” cancelled plans for open enrollment
despite career officials’ preparation and monetary commitments for publicity). Similar failures of
coordination between career and political officials appear to explain the failure of Department of
Homeland Security even to acknowledge a change in policy and a new statutory-abnegation claim
regarding the return of émigrés in the United States under TPS. See supra notes 44–48 (discussing
these actions). Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1089–98 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting
injunction, reviewing APA claims, and the policy change and the agency’s failure to disclose and
explain it); Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (denying motions to
dismiss and, after tracking policy changes and tensions between career and political appointees’
views, explaining why agency policy shifts without explanation and justification violate APA
requirements).
271. See Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Rank-and-File Tell of Discontent Over Session’s
Approach, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/us/politics/jeffsessions-justice-department.html [https://perma.cc/7GUS-NYGK] (discussing the results of
political leaders ignoring dissent and advice of career attorneys).
272. GOLDEN, supra note 241, at 44–60 (discussing tensions between political and career
officials and how they contributed to inadequately explained changes in seatbelt and airbag
regulation leading to the State Farm case); id. at 109–50 (describing stark differences in career and
political leadership’s interactions at the Reagan administration’s EPA, and how periods of tension
led to clashes and even “strong resistance, even guerilla warfare,” but also finding tension due to
political leaders’ delay, “footdragging,” and avoidance of “checks” created under the APA).
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when an agency seeks to shuck off some previously understood
authority, settled policy, or task.273 Career agency lawyers and staff, in
contrast, will often focus on longstanding agency practices, policy
goals, and long-term concerns about agency power and discretion, and
they will presumptively act in accordance with legislative, evidentiary,
and judicial constraints requiring technocratic and reasoned
decisionmaking.274 Career officials (whether civil servants or Senior
Executive Service) may also, due to their career choices and history of
work within an agency, feel a stronger dedication to the overall mission
of the agency, while political appointees pushing for deregulation may
overtly seek to dismantle the agency’s law and regulations.275 Due to
this clash, unreasoned or flawed regulatory changes may emerge.276
One analysis of the Reagan administration’s deregulatory efforts,
however, found only rare evidence of career employees intentionally
undercutting a new administration’s policy changes.277
273. Judge Wald describes this reality as common. Wald, supra note 249, at 651–52, 655.
274. See GOLDEN, supra note 241, at 151–66 (finding differences in agencies’ cultures and
interactions of career and political appointees).
275. Id.; see also infra notes 269–71 and accompanying text (discussing career-political
tensions and resulting problems); Benner, supra note 271 (describing such clashes at the
Department of Justice).
276. Although not identified in the deregulation literature, a form of “work-to-rule” protest
could also explain the legal inadequacies of the wave of deregulatory abnegation actions. If
political leaders insist on hastily issuing a policy change, career personnel could capitulate to their
hierarchical superiors and let the action become public without fighting for improvement. Cf.
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. Rev. 809, 818–19
(2015) (identifying extreme forms of obedience to rules as a means of protest, including “workingto-rule” strategies in labor law). In a possible example of capitulation as protest, the Army Corps
of Engineers reversed itself on a permit decision with no explanation other than obedience to the
president’s “direction” after a presidential memorandum seeking such action. See Buzbee, The
Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1389. A court similarly found federal agencies’ new Keystone
Pipeline environmental-impact analysis following a presidential directive to be shoddy and
inadequately explained, given the requirements of consistency doctrine. See Indigenous Envtl.
Network v. U.S. Dep’t. of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 582–84 (D. Mont. 2018) (identifying
inconsistencies and stating that agencies cannot “ignore inconvenient facts” (citation omitted)).
Despite the ruling and subsequent injunction, id. at 591, President Trump later withdrew his
earlier memorandum, “revoked” the earlier permit that had been judicially invalidated, and
purported to issue a direct “Presidential Permit.” Presidential Permit of March 29, 2019,
Authorizing TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., To Construct, Connect, Operate, and
Maintain Pipeline Facilities at the International Boundary Between the United States and
Canada, 84 Fed. Reg. 13,101 (Apr. 3, 2019). This further policy change and permit reversal relied
only on “the authority vested in” the president, cited no statutory authority, and neither included
nor referenced any legal explanation or analysis of effects previously ruled to be required by a
federal judge. Id. at 13,101.
277. See GOLDEN, supra note 241, at 109–50 (pulling together insights from agency-specific
chapters about reasons for sloppy or unsuccessful policy shifts, and finding only rare examples of
career efforts to undercut an administration’s new policy directions); see also supra notes 269–71
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4. Political Benefits Even if Vulnerable to Judicial Rejection.
Perhaps the best explanation for these many disavowals of agency
power is also the most troubling from the perspectives of the rule of
law, legislative supremacy, and political accountability—rationales that
underlie the legitimacy of the administrative state. Disavowals of
agency power and the regulatory rollbacks that accompany them can,
and indeed are likely to, generate political benefits wholly unrelated to
their legal merits. In fact, an agency’s embrace of rollbacks and the
diminution of its power may be of maximum political benefit where the
agency and presidential administration can reject the choices of
previous presidents and agency leaders. And if they can loudly and
repeatedly claim that a past administration’s work was egregiously
illegal, as claimed by abnegating agencies, that may be even better
politics. Agencies and presidents may also see benefits in publicly
rejecting the legislative work of a past Congress. Such regulatory
opposition by a president and from within an agency, even if contrary
to law, may appeal to a political party’s base or perhaps an electorally
important region.278 Legal disruption may not be a mistake or reflect
imprudence; it may be precisely the political goal. Agency statutory
abnegation hence could be a form of political speech, totally apart from
its legal merits.279 If so, regulatory integrity and compliance with
governing statutes may be of little or no importance. Political coalitions
supporting a president, agency leadership, or a political party may see
abrupt deregulatory relief and accompanying rhetoric as the delivery
on political promises, even if illegal under governing law and lacking a
supportive factual basis.
Further, targeted regulatory rollbacks can provide unusually
focused and tangible political and business benefits to industry actors,
akin to variances and exemptions from otherwise uniform and broadly
(citing additional sources regarding career-political official tensions and resulting flawed agency
actions).
278. The many Trump-administration regulatory rollbacks aimed at Midwestern and
Appalachian mining and oil-and-gas businesses have been broadly viewed, and even claimed, as
meant to benefit those regions and, in particular, coal interests. See Friedman, supra note 237
(reviewing the proposed rule’s effects, statements of President Trump about helping coal country,
and other coal-linked rollbacks); see also Emails of John Graham to author, supra note 262
(identifying political motivations and benefits even for legally vulnerable regulatory shifts).
279. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005)
(exploring government decisions as a form of dissent and political speech, especially in the
federalism arena); cf. Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1995, 2014–25 (2018) (discussing state legislatures taking away local governments’ powers and
questioning the wisdom and legality of states punishing local officials for their statements and
votes).
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imposed regulatory obligations.280 Even if the policy shift is eventually
rejected in the courts, agencies and presidents pursuing an overt and
vocal statutory-abnegation strategy still get to reveal their loyalties.
The very political responsiveness that abnegation manifests thus can
be—and often has been during 2017 and 2018—linked not to some
nuanced dispute over the best policy or statutory interpretation but,
when examined in overall context, to agencies’ direct and overt
opposition to governing laws and regulations that presidents and
agencies are nonetheless constitutionally obligated to “take care” to
“faithfully execute[].”281 Notably, none of the abnegation actions
reviewed above involve agencies expanding on or adjusting means to
achieve the protective goals behind (and usually stated within) statutes.
Across the board, these actions reflect a goal of reducing burdens on
businesses.
Because federal laws, by their very nature, tend to set national
goals and require uniform applicability, agencies and presidents
delivering promises of regulatory relaxation for particular sectors,
regions, or political supporters will often be acting in a legally suspect
manner.282 Statutes rarely permit consideration of such criteria. Thus,
deregulatory rollouts and accompanying political events have
sometimes made the intended beneficiaries clear; the actual regulatory

280. AARON L. NIELSON, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., WAIVERS, EXEMPTIONS, AND
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: AN EXAMINATION OF AGENCY NONENFORCEMENT PRACTICES
11–25 (2017) (reviewing cases on nonenforcement unreviewability and scholarship); id. at 24–25,
60 (identifying concerns with nonenforcement and the risk an agency could “nullify a valid act of
Congress,” act for “insiders” or with bias, and do so without transparency); Alfred C. Aman Jr.,
Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277,
323–28 (analyzing capture concerns with the use of regulatory exceptions, but also identifying
benefits of regulatory tailoring and flexibility); see also Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception
Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an
Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 263–300 (analyzing an exceptions process but identifying
extensive risks, mainly power accretion and loss of political accountability).
281. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. For discussion of this clause and its centrality to tensions over
the role of the administrative state and clashes between congressional choices and presidential
priorities, see Metzger, 1930s Redux, supra note 30, at 88–91.
282. Cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN AND WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR, OR
HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGHSULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981) (analyzing how a
Clean Air Act provision tilted regulatory choices to protect high-sulphur coal producers). Most
environmental and risk-regulation laws, however, call for nationally uniform standards without
criteria that reflect explicit or veiled regional favoritism. However, courts have allowed regionally
focused action in the enforcement-remedy setting when rational and not prohibited. E.g., Ctr. for
Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–17 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 452 F.3d
798 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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documents, in contrast, have used language with little or no attention
to distributional or political consequences.283
Furthermore, targets of regulation will often gain financially from
the delay between a president’s deregulatory directions, agency
abnegation claims, and eventual resolution in the courts.284 The time
required by this process will often accomplish a temporary, de facto
regulatory rollback. At a minimum, when agencies signal a shift in a
deregulatory direction, they will often stifle any momentum for more
rigorous or burdensome regulation. Business or technological shifts
and new business competition that might have justified further
regulatory rigor are also likely to be undercut with political signals that
regulatory demands for improved products or performance are
unlikely.285 And even if old regulations remain in force in the interim,
every brief filed and case appealed provides another press-worthy
declaration of political and regulatory priorities and loyalties.286
Paradoxically, one of the central tenets of skepticism about the
regulatory state and regulatory excess—that agencies are insensitive to
the economic burdens of regulation—can partly explain agencies’
many (likely fruitless) attempts at abnegation.287 Because
administrative officials are personally insensitive to squandered
resources, they may see repeated failed regulatory rollbacks as
nonetheless a victory due to related political benefits. They are unlikely
to personally pay for failed rollbacks, litigation expenses, wasted
agency resources, or harms befalling those left unprotected due to
283. See text accompanying supra note 274 (discussing coal-protective deregulation and overt
regionally focused appeals by the administration and supporters). The ACE proposed-rule notice
does not have a regional focus and rarely even mentions coal. See supra notes 76–79 (discussing
the genesis and substance of this proposed rule, and past regulation and delays). In contrast, coalfocused benefits have been an overt part of accompanying politics. Lisa Friedman, E.P.A. Will
Ease Path for New Coal Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2018, at B3 (describing and quoting
stakeholders about coal-targeted benefits); Press Release, White House, WTAS: Support for
Trump Administration’s Proposal to Replace the Costly and Overreaching Clean Power Plan
(Aug.
22,
2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/wtas-support-trumpadministrations-proposal-replace-costly-overreaching-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/SBL3X9XG] (containing four pages of quotes from politicians and interest groups supporting the
rollback and claiming Obama-administration overreach and benefits for the coal industry).
284. See Blais & Wagner, supra note 241, at 1711–15 (discussing benefits of delay for
regulatory targets, and citing supportive sources).
285. See Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, supra note 58, at 1051–57, 1081–92 (discussing linkage
of regulation and regulatory reversal risks, “federalism hedging,” and development of products
and practices to meet regulation-assisted demand).
286. See Emails of John Graham to author, supra note 262 (identifying political motivations
and benefits even if a policy action is unlikely to succeed in court).
287. Id.
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regulatory stasis or policy reversals.288 Such costs of failed deregulation
remain off the agency’s ledger, apart from the work involved with new
action following a judicial remand. Legal requirements may ultimately
be enforced, but the incentives created by the political and fiscal costs
and rewards may nonetheless drive more failed deregulatory efforts.
C. Abnegation, Politicized Regulation, and Political Accountability’s
Forms
Agencies justifying deregulation with statutory abnegation have
generally offered little in the way of explanation or scale-tipping
rationales, tending instead to make conclusory claims about past excess
and circumscribed statutory authority. Some abnegating agencies cite
presidential executive orders in tandem with the partial dissent of
Justice Rehnquist in State Farm and a sentence in Fox, both of which
acknowledge that a new president can legitimately push for a change
in regulatory priorities.289 Presidential involvement is presented as a
“plus,” if not implicitly viewed or presented as a decisive factor to
justify these regulatory rollbacks. This section analyzes forms of
political involvement and accountability and the statutory-abnegation
strategy, arguing that judicial resistance to this strategy is appropriate.
If one links the presidential-involvement rationale for statutory
abnegation to unitary-executive theorists’ views of the administrative
state—and deregulatory statements by President Trump and agency
heads echo such sentiments290—then a more fully fleshed-out argument
for abnegation appears inchoate, even if ultimately unpersuasive. That
is, agencies are deregulating consistent with the elected president’s
political preferences, and such vertical, hierarchical accountability and
respect for presidential wishes make the president directly and overtly
accountable for the regulatory shift. And, so the argument goes, this
direct alignment of agency and presidential views heightens the
constitutional legitimacy of agency action. Justice Kagan’s scholarship,
when she was a professor, offered a somewhat consistent view. She
argued that presidents should have presumptive authority to be
involved in agency decisionmaking if not statutorily prohibited;
288. Id. (identifying the minimal costs of failed policy actions to agency and agency leadership
as a reason vulnerable actions may be pursued, and also noting the political benefits of playing to
constituents).
289. See supra notes 149, 155, 166–67, 176–84 and accompanying text (presenting and
discussing agency reference to some of this language and State Farm).
290. See supra Parts I.A and I.B (presenting deregulatory proposals and accompanying
rationales and politics).
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however, she did not argue that presidential involvement creates a
proagency presumption.291 Justice Kavanaugh’s lengthy concurrence
about political accountability and the place of independent agencies in
In re Aiken County292 (written when he was still an appellate judge) is
similar but goes further.293 He constructs a president-centric theory of
“political accountability” and argues that presidential agency
leadership and the power to fire agency officials at will is a
constitutionally required feature of the administrative state.294 Much of
that dissent builds on broad language in the far narrower context of
layered for-cause protections from dismissal addressed in Free
Enterprise.295
Before questioning the adequacy of such hierarchical, presidentfocused accountability rationales, one caveat is necessary. A
president’s ability to nudge agencies to consider an action that would
further a president’s priorities, or to involve the White House in
regulatory deliberations if not prohibited by statute, are both generally
acceptable and even run-of-the-mill interactions.296 In addition,
presidents have the constitutionally rooted power to seek agency
reports.297 Similarly, both executive-agency heads and independentagency appointments will unsurprisingly involve political
considerations.298 Thus, any legal infirmities and normative concerns
with agency abnegation claims should not rest on the mere reality of
the president’s broad powers and usual efforts to nudge agencies in
preferred policy directions.
Instead, the point is that although presidents are routinely
involved in agency appointments and regulatory decisions, that reality

291. Kagan, supra note 254.
292. In re Aiken County, 645 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
293. Id. at 438–48 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
294. See id. In closing, Judge Kavanaugh softens his argument in light of precedent, but he
nonetheless repeatedly argues that the president’s constitutional position logically should include
the unfettered power to dismiss executive-branch officials. Id.
295. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492–514 (2010).
296. See Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1427–29 (identifying such
leadership nudges as legitimate and ordinary).
297. Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of Generalization—PCAOB in the Footsteps of
Myers, Humprey’s Executor, Morrison, and Freytag, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2258 (2011)
[hereinafter Strauss, Difficulties of Generalization] (discussing the president’s constitutionally
rooted right to seek opinions in writing from executive-branch officials).
298. Id. (discussing tensions between presidential authority and congressional choices about
agency design and regulatory goals).
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does not provide cover for violations of other legal edicts.299
Presidential involvement cannot excuse failures to act in accordance
with the politically accountable modes required by statutory and
regulatory law, along with centuries of administrative-law doctrine.300
More than presidential electoral accountability matters to the legality
of agency actions and policy changes.301 These intertwined bodies of
doctrine emphasize legislative supremacy and the need for agencies,
presidents, and courts to respect and enforce the substantive and
procedural choices of Congress.302 Presidents and politics can often
work to influence an agency choice, but only within the confines of
what Congress provides or delegates for agency discretion.303 As
developed more in the following discussion, political accountability as
a cross-doctrine value does not, upon closer analysis, do much to
advance the argument for statutory abnegation rooted in presidential
political predilections.
The first and most essential element of agency political
accountability is rooted in legislative supremacy. Congress sets policy
under its conferred powers and, through an express constitutional
grant, can fashion laws as “Necessary and Proper” to fulfill this role
and make government work to achieve its policy goals.304 In thousands
299. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 750–53 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”?]
(distinguishing between the president’s usual ability to oversee agencies and questionable efforts
to supplant the delegated agency with presidential decisions).
300. For arguments about the need for presidents to respect congressional choices, see Kevin
M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Power to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 284
(2006) (documenting a variety of statutory choices about agency and presidential power, and
arguing for respect for such varied choices); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.KENT L. REV. 965, 977–79 (1997) (same, with a focus on the different forms of political control
over agencies due to congressional and constitutional choices).
301. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
761 (2007) (discussing cases where courts review agency actions with a focus on whether the
agency exercised its authority “in a democratic fashion”).
302. Strauss, Difficulties of Generalization, supra note 297, at 2275 (emphasizing the
president’s obligation to respect the placement of power in agencies subject to statutorily set
criteria and procedure).
303. For additional analysis of settings and degrees of presidential control, see Buzbee, The
Tethered President, supra note 10 at 1427–41, and supra notes 269–77 and accompanying text
(citing and discussing career and political official tensions and how they can influence agency
actions).
304. See John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1046–58 (2014)
(providing a historical perspective on such clauses and the powers they conferred); see also Gillian
E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 DUKE L.J. 1607, 1639
(2015) (citing John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2014)) (questioning the Supreme Court’s
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of laws, Congress has stated policy priorities, designated the
responsible regulatory actors, set forth the process through which
agencies act, and provided criteria to guide each agency’s
multitudinous regulatory tasks.305 All agency actions need to conform
to these congressional choices. And, conversely, agencies cannot
decline their roles, ignore required process, or base their decisions on
factors outside the law.306 Even if a president becomes involved in an
agency action, the action’s legality is still assessed for conformity with
congressional choices.307 And courts, too, are not to second guess the
goals and means chosen by Congress.308 Those are choices for
Congress, although enforced by the courts.
Furthermore, that the president holds executive authority
conferred by the Constitution does not mean that authority is
unfettered. Under the Constitution, the president must also “take
care” that the law of the land is “faithfully executed.”309 As mandated
in Massachusetts v. EPA and dozens of other Supreme Court and
lower-court decisions before and after, agencies and presidents cannot
toss aside regulatory tasks assigned by Congress based on factors
outside the relevant statute.310 As the Supreme Court stated in City of
Arlington,311 agencies’ “power to act and how they are to act is
authoritatively prescribed by Congress, so when they act improperly,
no less than when they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is
ultra vires.”312 Similarly, in the recent, unanimous Weyerhaeuser313

resistance to innovation and lack of deference to how Congress allocates authority to agencies
due to the Necessary and Proper Clause’s “textual assignment” of this power to Congress).
305. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
462–63 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing agency accountability and how congressional choices shape what
agencies can do).
306. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing Massachusetts v. EPA and consistency-doctrine cases
establishing substantive and procedural statutory prerequisites for agency policy change, some of
which involved abnegation claims).
307. See Seidenfeld, supra note 21 (acknowledging politics in regulation but arguing that
judicial review must focus on the agency action for conformity with the law, as evidenced by the
agency’s stated justifications and explication of tradeoffs).
308. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194–95 (1978) (enforcing the mandates of the
Endangered Species Act and explaining the need for courts to respect congressional choices).
309. See generally Stack, supra note 300 (discussing the roots of presidential obligations to
respect congressional choices); Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”?, supra note 299 (same).
310. For discussion of Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), see supra notes 32–41 and
accompanying text.
311. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
312. Id. at 297–98.
313. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018).
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decision, the Court affirmed the “familiar” principle that agencies must
“consider all of the relevant factors that the statute sets forth to guide
the agency in the exercise of its discretion.”314
Relatedly, the APA’s presumptively applicable procedural modes
and framework for judicial review also reflect an enduring
congressional commitment to the regularity of agency procedure and a
mandate for agencies to explain and justify their choices.315 The courts’
longstanding requirement of “reasoned decisionmaking” and, in
reviewing recent abnegation actions, enforcement of APA mandates
reify those commitments. This body of doctrine is now a hybrid of
statutory interpretation and administrative common law, reflecting a
“morality” of administrative law with deep roots in rule-of-law
aspirations.316
Moreover, despite the breadth of agencies’ conferred powers,
judicial review of agency actions has long been viewed as essential for
agency legitimacy and as an important element underpinning judicial
acceptance of broad delegations of power to agencies.317 Courts insist
that agency actions rise and fall based on the justification provided
contemporaneously with the action.318 Agency actions, even if possibly
acceptable in result, will be rejected if not adequately explained or
justified, a requirement that enables courts to fulfill their reviewing
function.319 And that judicial function is contingent on agencies acting
through participatory and transparent processes and in conformity
with substantive and procedural requirements. As noted in Sierra Club

314. Id. at 371.
315. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (stating courts should not
have to “speculate on reasons that might support an agency’s decision”). Section 559 of the APA,
by making its requirements presumptively applicable and requiring express contrary indications
by Congress before agencies can ignore the APA, reflects Congress’s enduring embrace of the
reasoned decisionmaking of agencies and robust judicial review. Courts rigorously enforce these
requirements. Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1403–07 (reviewing “reasoned
decisionmaking” doctrine and its importance to review of deregulatory rollbacks).
316. See Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, supra note 24, at 1359–70
(discussing administrative law’s development in a common law–like manner); Sunstein &
Vermeule, supra note 260, at 1947–55 (discussing “rule of law” values, consistency doctrine, and
reliance interests as forms of “morality” enforced by administrative law).
317. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 305, at 860 (quoting Thomas W. Merrill,
Delegation and Judicial Review, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 (2010) and David S. Tatel, The
Administrative Process and the Rule of Environmental Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010)
for this proposition).
318. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 89–90 (1943) (discussing the standard for
determining what is fair and equitable).
319. Id. at 93–95.

BUZBEE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

AGENCY STATUTORY ABNEGATION

4/25/2019 4:08 PM

1581

v. Costle,320 regulation is in part a political process that leaves room for
some unrecorded and informal communications within and among the
branches.321 Were mere presidential prodding or pressure all that was
needed to explain an agency action, however, these other checks to
ensure legality and rationality would be weakened.322
Lastly, Congress creates agencies in a remarkable array of forms.
Agency abnegation due to obeisance to a president’s preferences or
edicts will often run afoul of congressional choices. Among the
variables reflected in those agency forms are nuanced differences in the
criteria agencies are to weigh and the procedures through which they
must act. The more a president could influence an agency choice with
nonstatutory mandates or mere off-the-record nudges, the more that
agency action could stray from congressionally reticulated mandates.323
When Congress imposes on agencies specific tasks, criteria, and
procedures, the room for politically driven agency action dwindles.324
Furthermore, Congress often chooses to create and harness
independent agencies, with their usual stable but rotating
multimember commission structure and protections against dismissal
without cause. When it does so, Congress has chosen to add even more
agency insulation from the oscillating political whims of presidential
administrations.325 This could reflect a congressional preference for
legal stability, for technocratic or science-based decisionmaking, or for
policy moderation less buffeted by partisan rancor.326
320. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
321. Id. at , 405–08.
322. See Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?, supra note 299, at 713 (quoting EDWARD S.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1957, at 80–81 (4th rev. ed. 1957))
(questioning the constitutionality of presidents claiming broad power to displace congressional
choices).
323. Unrecorded influence in politicized notice-and-comment rulemakings is allowed, Sierra
Club, 657 F.2d at 406–08, but the agency action still must be justified under the law and the agency
record. See also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Pwr. Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524
(1978) (prohibiting judicial imposition of process not required by statutes or agency regulations,
but emphasizing that review for substantive justification remains); Seidenfeld, supra note 21, at
151 (emphasizing the need for judicial review to focus on agency justifications while
acknowledging the ubiquity of political influence).
324. See infra Part III.D (discussing cases rejecting abnegation-based policy shifts and noting
courts’ careful parsing of the APA and enabling acts for their procedural requirements and
governing substantive criteria).
325. See MARSHALL J. BREGER & GARY J. EDLES, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 385–96 (2015) (discussing recent resistance to the role of independent agencies and
addressing countervailing arguments). See generally id. (discussing the logic behind and forms of
independent agencies).
326. See generally id. (discussing historical goals of expertise and insulation in the context of
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D. Judicial Enforcement of the Agency Obligation to Engage
Massachusetts v. EPA and an early wave of judicial rejections of
Trump-administration deregulatory actions reveal that courts apply no
different or easier judicial review merely because an agency asserts a
statutory-abnegation claim. Courts take seriously the requirement that
agencies conform their conduct to requirements of their enabling acts,
the APA, and the body of law collectively described here as
consistency doctrine. Courts require agencies to fully engage with their
governing law and underlying regulatory contingencies, and to leave
no “unexplained inconsistency.”327 This includes a judicial requirement
that agencies explain changes in the agency’s view of its power and the
effects of such a change. The crosscutting theme of these decisions is
that reasoned decisionmaking is essential for agencies to respect
congressional mandates, to preserve agency legitimacy, and to allow
courts to fulfill their role as monitors of agency actions.328 Political
accountability in all of its forms remains a strong requirement enforced
by the courts.
For example, as reviewed earlier, when the Bush administration’s
EPA tried to justify inaction on climate change with reference to
presidential priorities and foreign-policy repercussions—as well as
abnegation claims rooted in textual analysis, “major questions”
precedents, and the claimed need for clearer authorization—the
Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA resoundingly rejected EPA’s
arguments.329 The Court focused on the statute’s broad language, the
lack of statutory grounding for EPA’s rationales for inaction, and the
fact that the agency had not yet engaged with the science relevant to
the Clean Air Act’s requirements. Both in its discussion of standing
and its overall construction of the statute, the Court mandated that the
agency undertake whatever actions Congress had required based on
the statutory criteria, even if regulation would represent only an
incremental step toward a larger goal.330 The agency’s “reasons for
major precedents).
327. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing cases articulating the requirements of consistency
doctrine for agencies seeking to make a policy change).
328. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Encino Motorcars explicitly linked the agency
obligation to engage in “reasoned decisionmaking” to the more particular variables agencies must
address when making a policy change. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–
27 (2016).
329. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–35 (2007); see also supra notes 40–41 and
accompanying text (introducing the significance of Massachusetts v. EPA).
330. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533 (noting the statutory limits on EPA’s
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action or inaction must conform to the authorizing statute,” the Court
declared.331 It rejected EPA’s declination to act based on a “laundry
list” of nonstatutory considerations.332
Appellate and district courts ruling on the first wave of Trumpadministration deregulatory actions have used similar language and
reached similar conclusions. Many of these rulings involved agency
efforts to abandon or delay regulations promulgated late in the Obama
administration. In doing so, agencies often argued for a delay or stay,
promised some return to an alleged status quo, or indicated that future
policy change was likely.333 As shown in Part I’s survey of abnegation
claims, most such deregulatory actions involved agency claims that the
past administration exceeded its statutory powers, although in some
actions agencies parroted industry’s empirical claims of overregulation
or doubts about the efficacy of the earlier regulatory strategy.334 And,
as discussed above, most of these delay or stay actions, like abnegation
claims more generally, have involved little or no accompanying
engagement with past reasoning and underlying facts and science
previously viewed as central.
Several courts rejected the Trump administration’s abnegationbased abandonment of DACA—the Obama administration’s policy of
immigration forbearance for “Dreamers”—with the opinions
substantially tracking one another’s logic.335 Two courts found legal
error, inadequate explanation, and a violation of consistency doctrine
in DHS’s failure to engage with earlier factual considerations and legal
views.336A third decision did not itself determine the lawfulness of

discretion); id. at 52–25 (stating that “[a]gencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive
problems in one fell regulatory swoop” but “whittle away at them over time,” and discussing a
standing remedy as shaped by analysis of “whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce
it” (emphasis added)).
331. Id. at 533.
332. Id.
333. See Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note 10, at 1376–90 (reviewing a wide array
of Trump deregulatory actions); Lisa Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays, supra note 209, at 16–47
(analyzing early Trump-administration stay-and-delay actions and judicial rejections).
334. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wheeler, 899 F.3d 814, 820–21, 829 (9th
Cir. 2018) (rejecting EPA’s reversal of a proposed revocation of regulation of chlorpyrifos due to
the claim that “science . . . remains unresolved,” in light of EPA violating express statutory
criteria and deadlines and failing to respond to submitted objections or explain changed agency
views about associated risks).
335. The DACA policy and its reversal is introduced in supra notes 49–55 and accompanying
text.
336. See Vidal v. Nielsen 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 420–22 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding the DACA
reversal was rooted in legal error); id. at 427–33 (finding the agency committed factual errors,
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DACA but declined to enjoin the rescission due to a finding that the
rescission was based on a “legitimate belief” in its lawfulness and
agency concerns with litigation; notably, that opinion also did not
discuss consistency-doctrine precedents.337
A fourth DACA decision found the agency’s legal justification too
lacking in any actual explanation to be worthy of affirmation.338 The
judge gave DHS an opportunity to offer a more fulsome legal rationale
before imposing a national injunction but, upon a later review, still
found the rescission inadequately justified.339 This court was concerned
with the diminished accountability of policy changes rooted in
unexplained abnegation, even in the setting of enforcement choices
where agencies generally wield broad discretion: “When an official
claims that the law requires her to exercise her enforcement authority
in a certain way, however, she excuses herself from this
accountability.”340 The court concluded that “an official cannot claim
that the law ties her hands while at the same time denying the courts’
power to unbind her. She may escape political accountability or judicial
review, but not both.”341 The court hence refused to accept the validity
of the DACA rescission, on the basis that it was rooted in what were
either erroneous or inadequately explained legal views.
The series of regulatory proposals and actions to revise or
abandon the Clean Water Rule have similarly relied in part on
statutory abnegation, with EPA and the Army Corps under the Trump
administration claiming that the Obama administration’s Clean Water
failed to offer logical legal reasoning, and did not analyze “reliance” interests as required by
consistency doctrine); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d
1011, 1037–46 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussing whether the
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious).
337. Casa de Md. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758, 774 (D. Md. 2018).
That court did, however, enjoin the department from utilizing information submitted by
Dreamers in response to DACA.
338. See NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 238 (D.D.C. 2018) (“This scant legal
reasoning was insufficient to satisfy the department’s obligation to explain its departure from its
prior stated view that DACA was lawful.”); see also NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 473
(D.D.C. 2018) (reconsidering DHS actions in light of a new government rationale, but adhering
to earlier conclusions that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious).
339. See NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 249 (vacating the decision to rescind DACA,
but staying the order of vacatur for ninety days to allow DHS to provide a better explanation);
NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 467–69 (finding that the new government explanation still
failed to provide a “sufficient basis” to revise the earlier judgment that the agency policy was
rooted in error about “what the law requires,” and also rejecting “serious doubts” and “litigation
risk” rationales due to how they could allow an agency to evade judicial review).
340. NCAAP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 249.
341. Id.
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Rule exceeded the agencies’ statutory authority.342 The first court
decision rejected the addition of a new “applicability date” that worked
to suspend the Clean Water Rule’s requirements.343 The court in no
way granted the agencies greater latitude to revise, rescind, or delay
the 2015 finalized rule based on the abnegation claim. The court
instead noted the agencies’ prohibition of merits comments (which was
found to be unlawful), failures to comply with the APA’s procedural
requirements, and neglect of consistency doctrine. Agencies may be
able to change policy, the court recognized, but they must supply a
“reasoned analysis,” allow meaningful opportunity for comment, and
show “at least some fidelity to law and legal process.”344 Otherwise,
“government [would] become ‘a matter of the whim and caprice of the
bureaucracy.’”345 The court noted that its finding of legal infirmities
was consistent with a raft of other rejections of “similarly hastily
enacted rules.”346 This last comment appears to indicate an additional
degree of judicial skepticism for agency policy changes that lack the
usual factually driven and slow-moving deliberative process leading to
regulatory change.
In Bauer v. DeVos,347 the court rejected the Trump Department of
Education’s effort to delay implementation of the 2016 “Borrower
Defense Regulations.”348 The form of abnegation attempted there was
a bit unusual and convoluted. The Department claimed that due to
litigation challenges and other questions about the Borrower Defense
Regulations, it would stay the regulations’ effective date under APA
section 705, and due to that stay, a separate statutory provision, the
“Master Calendar Provision,” required the agency (in its view) to delay
any implementation of the Obama-era regulations until July 2019.349
The department thus claimed it had no choice but to do so. The court
rejected the department’s interpretation of section 705 as authorizing
stays, its sidestepping of a statutory negotiated-rulemaking mandate,

342. These actions are introduced supra at notes 80–95 and accompanying text.
343. See S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 967 (D.S.C. 2018)
(vacating the new “Suspension Rule” after finding it arbitrary and capricious).
344. Id. (quoting N.C. Growers’ Ass’n v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755, 772 (4th Cir.
2012) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)).
345. Id. (quoting N.C. Growers’ Ass’n, 702 F.3d at 772 (Wilkinson, J., concurring)).
346. Id. at 965; see id. at 966 & n.2 (citing eight judicial decisions rejecting new agency rules).
347. Bauer v. DeVos, 325 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
348. Id. at 78–79.
349. Id. at 85 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1089(c)(1) (2012)).
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and the claim that it had no choice but to provide a multiyear delay.350
The court also noted that the department failed to provide a balanced
comparative assessment of the effects of the implementation delay on
those regulated and on students losing regulatory protections, explain
inconsistencies in approaches under the 2016 regulations and the delay
attempts, or engage rigorously with its own contrary legal analysis of
the need for the Borrower Defense Regulations and its own regulatory
powers.351 More than other cases, the court repeatedly criticized the
department for leaving so much “unexplained.”352 Agencies must, the
court stated, provide explanation “that will enable the court to evaluate
the agency’s rationale.”353 Here, again, a court emphasized the
importance of clear comparative legal explanation by the agency, in
part so the court could fulfill its own role in ensuring that the agency
had acted legally and through a process providing political
accountability and legitimacy.
In Pennsylvania v. Trump,354 the Department of Health and
Human Services fared no better in defending an “interim final rule”
that was issued without a preceding notice-and-comment process.355
This new rule would have allowed employers to opt out of no-cost
contraceptive coverage under the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act.356 Here too, the agency relied on a mix of claims about
inherent authority and its power under the APA, and on a new claim
that it lacked discretion under the statute and hence had to reject its
earlier action and provide the requested relief.357 The court rejected the
agency’s construction of the APA, its view of statutory requirements
for religious accommodation, and its interpretation of the Affordable

350. Id. at 95–96 (stating that although the department claimed its “hands were tied,” it was
not given Chevron deference, and its reading of the “Master Calendar Provision” was invalid).
351. See id. at 96–110 (presenting and rejecting the department’s numerous arguments).
352. Id. at 100, 109–10. The court disagreed with the department’s claims about having no
statutory choice and also disagreed with how the court construed substantive law and the APA.
Id. at 95–96, 109.
353. Id. at 108 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990)).
354. Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2017)
355. See id. at 585 (concluding “that a preliminary injunction [was] warranted” to enjoin the
interim final rule).
356. Id. at 563. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at scattered sections at U.S.C. chs. 25, 26, & 42).
357. Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 571–81. The agency claimed that due to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the earlier administration’s provision of an
“Accommodation Process” was illegal and required immediate action without the APA’s “timeconsuming notice and comment process.” Id. at 573.
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Care Act.358 It concluded that the agency had failed to weigh
congressional policy choices to protect women’s health in the Act.359
The agency had to provide a full notice-and-comment process, as
evidenced by the massive interest in the original policies and in
response to the interim final rule.360 The agency’s concerns with
“uncertainty” and “speculation, unsupported by the record” were
inadequate to justify the agency’s actions.361 The court called the
agency’s effort to “sidestep . . . the strictures of the notice and comment
procedure . . . matryoshkanesque in its construction.”362 The agency’s
reliance on three statutes to claim it had no choice was wholly
rejected.363
These opinions reviewing abnegation claims, all of which involved
minimal agency engagement with past factual or scientific findings,
past legal reasoning, or clear comparative analysis of the effects of the
new and discarded or delayed regulation, reveal courts hewing to
regulatory rule-of-law fundamentals. They also hew to what the
Supreme Court has long required for an agency to justify a policy
change.364 Agencies must address past reasoning, offer “good reasons”
for their new choice, leave no unexplained inconsistency, address
reliance interests or changes in conditions between the original and
revised action or policy, and address all factual or scientific findings
relevant to the original and revised action.365 No court excuses the
required analysis in cases of abnegation. Similarly, although courts
dutifully quote key language from administrative-law doctrine,
including the usual room for presidents to pursue different regulatory
priorities, none view conformity with the president’s wishes as
shielding the agency from ordinary judicial scrutiny. None see this
possibility of change and presidential agreement as legally adequate or,
it appears, as even improving the agency’s odds of winning. Courts
expect compliance with statutes’ substantive and procedural
358. Id. at 571–81.
359. See id. at 584 (stating in its discussion of the “balance of the equities” prong that
“Congress has already struck the balance” to “bridge the significant gender gap in healthcare
costs between men and women”).
360. Id. at 574.
361. Id. at 573–74.
362. Id. at 571. The court appears to be referring to this complicated, multistatute-based
argument as akin to nesting Russian dolls.
363. Id. at 571–73 (rejecting the agency’s argument that a combination of statutes required
the provision of religious relief and that the agency could bypass notice and comment).
364. See supra Part II.A.4 (setting forth key elements of consistency doctrine).
365. See supra notes 168–205 and accompanying text.
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requirements and look for indicia that agencies acted through
“reasoned decisionmaking.” Political accountability in all of its forms
remains essential.
E. The “Why Bother” Rationale for Abnegation
This section concludes the Article with analysis of the argument—
or perhaps the implicit assertion of abnegating agencies—that
abnegation-based policy changes should be allowed without the usual
rigorous comparative analysis called for by consistency doctrine. Why
bother with all of that empirical analysis of on-the-ground effects and
providing of “good reasons” for a change if the earlier action was
rooted in an illegal claim of power? This section argues that courts
should reject such an invitation to create a lesser burden of justification
for policy changes involving abnegation. Abnegation claims will rarely
truly be rooted in a claim of no power. Rather, most involve new claims
of excess stringency or an agency changing its view about the range of
potentially appropriate actions. And even if an abnegation claim of “no
power whatsoever” might now and then be plausible, assessing that
claim still requires the agency and reviewing courts to compare legal
reasoning and how it relates to effects of the allegedly illegal past
action and effects of the new, different view of agency power.
Consistency doctrine’s analytical requirements logically should
continue to apply even when an agency makes an apparently tenable
abnegation claim.
Most importantly, plausible disclaimers of agency power despite
contrary earlier claims will be rare. It is notable that no agency
asserting that it completely lacked the power previously claimed has
yet (as of publication) elicited judicial agreement that the agency
actually lacked all such power. Broad agency claims of complete lack
of power are, upon examination, often in error; few laws contain such
clear mandates or preclusions. Most abnegation actions involve
political statements about past regulatory excess or an argument for a
different regulatory approach. Several of the political rationales for
lowered analytical hurdles for abnegating agencies—time savings,
expedited deregulation, and avoidance of politically costly disclosure
of the downsides of deregulation—are completely untenable if the
agency has options about how to act. Uniform Supreme Court
precedent requires full agency engagement and explanation for policy
change in a setting where several choices are possible; agencies must
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provide an assessment of their relative impacts.366 If a new choice is
better or equally appropriate under the law and relevant facts, the
policy shift might be possible, but the agency must justify such a
comparative claim. Policy choice, not complete lack of power, is the
norm. And agencies must explain and justify a new choice.
Even if an agency makes a tenable claim that the earlier regulatory
action was illegal, that claim often focuses on a particular manner of
regulating, perhaps due to a claim of unjustifiable stringency or that
the earlier regulation relied on a regulatory tool or mode later viewed
as inappropriate. In these settings, the possibly tenable claim of
illegality would not mean that the agency lacks any power to act. The
agency would still need to explain what it will or can do with the power
that it does have, explain its different statutory construction, and show
how its new choice conforms to the statutory power that is conferred
(as newly construed). Because statutory interpretation usually involves
a language component first, then assessment of triggers (or reasons)
for an agency action, and then explanation for the responsive action
taken, the new approach must still be shown to conform to law in light
of relevant effects and statutory criteria and goals. With these sorts of
illegality claims, comparative analysis remains essential for courts to
fulfill their reviewing role.
For example, EPA included abnegation-based claims when it
proposed to roll back or replace the CPP, but it nonetheless was acting
in an area of clear statutory authority to regulate power plants for their
GHG emissions.367 Its shift to a different view of permissible regulatory
tools cannot be assessed without some analysis of the comparative
effects of the new and old claims of power, since the statute still
requires the agency to regulate based on assessment of the “best
system” of “emission reduction.”368 EPA might have latitude to
reconceive of what it views as “best” and able to be regulated, but

366. See supra Part II.A.4.
367. For example, EPA has long regulated power-plant emissions. The Supreme Court
alluded to EPA’s power to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions under section 111(d) of the Clean
Air Act in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423–25 (2011). EPA under
the Trump administration still does not wholly disclaim power. The Trump EPA claimed it had
to regulate “inside the fenceline” and disavowed authority to limit pollution levels to what could
be achieved with “generation shifting,” which took into account actions outside of individual
facilities. See supra notes 56–79 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 56–66 and accompanying text (presenting the genesis of and statutory
basis offered for the CPP).
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consideration of “emission reduction[s]” achievable under both views
of EPA power would remain a relevant consideration.
To distill this point, even if Regulatory Tool A were rightly
claimed to be illegal, that does not logically (or under current doctrine,
legally) excuse the agency from fully explaining its later embrace of
Regulatory Tool B where the source of risk still remains subject to
regulation. And because language and an action’s rationale and effects
are all relevant to an agency’s power, consistency doctrine’s
requirements would still make sense, even if a court might ultimately
agree that Regulatory Tool A was illegal. Comparative analysis and
justification would remain essential to allow for judicial assessment of
the agency’s new, different choice.
Only if an agency could tenably claim no power whatsoever to act
in a realm could one anticipate that courts might be tempted to relieve
agencies of their usual consistency-doctrine analytical hurdles. None of
the abnegation examples involve such total-lack-of-power claims; the
closest example (although quite dubious) was EPA’s claim it had no
power at all to regulate reconstructed and refurbished trucks in the
“Glider” rule.369 Even if the agency’s earlier position was rooted in
consideration of the effects of some activity seemingly beyond the
agency’s reach, or in the use of some allegedly prohibited regulatory
method or tool, then the new agency position—that it has no power to
regulate—would logically need to engage on these very points in order
to explain itself. Again, consistency doctrine’s call for comparative
reasoning, “good reasons,” and engagement on issues of underlying
science and fact makes sense.
Moreover, an analytical carveout for “no power whatsoever”
abnegation claims would foment strategic agency efforts to dodge the
burdens of transparent and comparative agency analysis, and leave
reviewing courts without critical information. Recognizing such a
carveout with attendant reduced analytical burdens would require
courts to draw lines between permissible bare abnegation-based policy
shifts and policy changes subject to the usual comparative analysis
required by consistency doctrine. In the closely analogous City of
Arlington case, the Supreme Court declined to treat differently claims
that an agency acted outside its jurisdiction and claims of other sorts of

369. See supra notes 99–106 and accompanying text (tracing the glider rule’s history).
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agency illegality.370 Such distinctions, the Court concluded, would
cause endless strategic maneuvering and confusion.371
Similarly, despite the possibility of rare, sound agency claims of
complete lack of power, courts should reject entreaties for a new
abnegation exception from consistency doctrine. The lines between
excess stringency, alleged use of an illegal tool where an agency does
have power, and a claim of no power whatsoever will often be a
continuum. Rarely will effects of agency power claims and choices be
irrelevant. The enduring body of law governing agency policy change
remains sound and logical. No abnegation exception to agency
obligations to engage in “reasoned decisionmaking” and conform to
consistency doctrine should be created.
CONCLUSION
Although numerous agencies during 2017 and 2018 asserted
statutory-abnegation justifications for deregulation, they did so with
consistent inattention to substantive and procedural statutory
requirements in both the APA and enabling acts. They also generally
made little or no effort to satisfy the long-established requirements for
reasoned agency decisionmaking and for agency policy change under
consistency doctrine. Governing doctrine and the first wave of judicial
rejections of statutory abnegation reveal little sympathy for this novel
and previously uncommon rationale for an agency policy change.
These widely trumpeted deregulatory actions may have been good
politics, but so far they have come up short under the law. Political
accountability in all of its forms matters. Agencies making hasty,
unreasoned, and conclusory claims that they lack power may gain quick
political credit. Such new claims of no agency power may also provide
benefits for those left less regulated due to the abnegation claim and
the related—but likely temporary—regulatory rollback. For enduring
policy change, however, current doctrine wisely requires the same full
process, deliberation, and sound legal and factual grounding that has
always preceded successful agency policymaking.

370. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297–98 (2013).
371. Id.

